The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
Abstract
challenged.' In this paper, I wish to take a fresh look at Frankfurt's attack on PAP from a libertarian viewpoint. I shall try to show that it does not succeed when applied to mental acts such as deciding, choosing, undertaking, forming an intention, that is, mental acts that for the libertarian constitute the basic loci of moral responsibility. If correct, this result will enable us to formulate a necessary condition for moral responsibility that is more adequate than PAP and not vulnerable to Frankfurt's criticism. At the outset, let me state a number of assumptions that I shall employ in the discussion to follow. First, the version of libertarianism I intend to defend is the view that an agent's decision (choice) is free in the sense of freedom required for moral responsibility only if (i) it is not causally determined, and (ii) in the circumstances in which the agent made that decision (choice), he could have avoided making it.2 Second, I take 'a given act A' in
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Citations
Cites
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
Frankfurt, H. G. (1969) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2023833 · Cited by 2,405
Plantinga, A. (1978) · doi:10.1093/0198244142.001.0001 · Cited by 843
van Inwagen, P. (1983) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 807
Goldman, A. I. (2015) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400868971 · Cited by 743
Fischer, J. M., & Journal of Philosophy Inc. (1982) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/jphil198279159 · Cited by 419
An Essay on Moral Responsibility.
Gorr, M., & Zimmerman, M. (1991) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2107898 · Cited by 405
Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil
Adams, R. M. (1977) · American Philosophical Quarterly · Cited by 304
Mele, A. R. (1992) · Cited by 174
Frankfurt on the principle of alternate possibilities
Naylor, M. B. (1984) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/bf00373108 · Cited by 119
Evaluative Compatibilism and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities
Lamb, J. W. (1993) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2941025 · Cited by 96
An Essay on Moral Responsibility.
Vihvelin, K., & Zimmerman, M. J. (1992) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2185573 · Cited by 84
Incompatibilism without the principle of alternative possibilities
Heinaman, R. (1986) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048408612342481 · Cited by 76
Cited by
Kane, R. (1999) · doi:10.1093/0195126564.001.0001 · Cited by 1,316
Mele, A. R. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195305043.001.0001 · Cited by 493
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Clarke, R. (2003) · doi:10.1093/019515987x.001.0001 · Cited by 474
The Oxford Handbook of Free Will
(2011) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001 · Cited by 332
Metadata
- Authors
- Widerker, D.
- Venue
- The Philosophical Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1995-04
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 247
- ISSN
- 0031-8108 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2047737137
- Cited by
- 357
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 1.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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