Cited by 1,409Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEpistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsMental Health and Psychiatry

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Intrinsic Quality of Experience

Harman, Gilbert·1990·Philosophical Perspectives

Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

There are three familiar and related arguments against psychophysical functionalism and the computer model of the mind. The first is that we are directly aware of intrinsic features of our experience and argues that there is no way to account for this awareness in a functional view. The second claims that a person blind from birth can know all about the functional role of visual experience without knowing what it is like to see something red. The third claims that functionalism cannot account for the possibility of an inverted spectrum. All three arguments can be defused by distinguishing properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2307/2214186

Cites

18 of 18 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Untitled work
(1960) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 5,851
Untitled work
(1987) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 4,269
What Mary Didn't Know
Jackson, F. (1986) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2026143 · Cited by 1,424
Content and Consciousness.
Dent, N. J. H., & Dennett, D. C. (1970) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2217666 · Cited by 1,140
On What There is
Ayer, A. J. (1972) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-00132-3_9 · Cited by 984
Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology
Block, N., & Philosophy Documentation Center (1986) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1987.tb00558.x · Cited by 775
Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States
Churchland, P. M. (1985) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2026509 · Cited by 590
The Inverted Spectrum
Shoemaker, S. (1982) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2026213 · Cited by 468
Perception: A Representative Theory.
ROSENTHAL, D. M., & Jackson, F. (1985) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2026510 · Cited by 270

Flagged first, then by citations

Show all 18 references

Sorted by citations

Items 401–500 of 1,000

Imperative Transparency
Martínez, M. (2021) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzab009 · Cited by 10
Spatial representations in sensory modalities
Cheng, T. (2022) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12409 · Cited by 10
Anticipation and variation in visual content
Madary, M. (2012) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9926-3 · Cited by 10
Rationality, Justification, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate
Langsam, H. (2007) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-007-9059-9 · Cited by 10
Personal-Level Representation
Kriegel, U. (2012) · De Gruyter eBooks · doi:10.1515/9783110325843.109 · Cited by 10
Reductive Representationalism and Emotional Phenomenology
Kriegel, U. (2017) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/misp.12072 · Cited by 10
Emotion as High-level Perception
Yip, B. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03109-4 · Cited by 10
Joint attention and communication
Harder, R. (2022) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2022.2074101 · Cited by 10
OCCURRENT PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE
Soteriou, M. (2011) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2011.00213.x · Cited by 10
Temporally Token-Reflexive Experiences
Kriegel, U. (2009) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1353/cjp.0.0064 · Cited by 10
Seeing it all clearly: The real story on blurry vision
Schroer, R. (2002) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 10
Mary Meets Molyneux: The Explanatory Gap and the Individuation of Phenomenal Concepts1
Macdonald, C. (2004) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00480.x · Cited by 10
Dissolving the Explanatory Gap: Neurobiological Differences Between Phenomenal and Propositional Knowledge
Musacchio, J. M. (2002) · Brain and Mind · doi:10.1023/a:1022911411903 · Cited by 10
Constituent causation and the reality of mind
Rey, G. (1990) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00080535 · Cited by 10
Experience and time
Phillips, I. B. (2009) · UCL Discovery (University College London) · Cited by 10
Network Impact on Quality of Experience of Mobile Video
Minhas, T. N. (2012) · Diva portal (Dalarna University Library) · Cited by 10
Temporal Experience and Metaphysics
Peebles, G. (2017) · Manuscrito · doi:10.1590/0100-6045.2017.v40n1.gp · Cited by 9
Against Representationalism
Papineau, D. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198862390.003.0003 · Cited by 8
What’s in a (Mental) Picture
Voltolini, A. (2015) · Synthese Library/Synthese library · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-18362-6_18 · Cited by 9
Reflexive theories of consciousness and unconscious perception
Peebles, G. (2018) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2017.1371286 · Cited by 4
Prinzipien und Grundlagen der Wahrnehmungsauffassung bei Husserl
Liu, C. (2019) · Husserl Studies · doi:10.1007/s10743-019-09243-9 · Cited by 9
The reticence of visual phenomenal character: A spatial interpretation of transparency
Schroer, R. (2007) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048400701571644 · Cited by 9
What is What it’s Like? Introducing Perceptual Modes of Presentation
Kulvicki, J. V. (2007) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-006-0003-3 · Cited by 9
The Notion of Point of View
Campos, M. V., & Gutiérrez, A. M. L. (2015) · Studies in applied philosophy, epistemology and rational ethics · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-19815-6_1 · Cited by 8
Philosophy of mind in the phenomenological tradition
Walsh, P. J., & Yoshimi, J. (2018) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780429508127-2 · Cited by 9
Must naive realists be relationalists?
Steenhagen, M. (2019) · European Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/ejop.12462 · Cited by 9
What’s so naïve about naïve realism?
Raineri, C. (2021) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-021-01618-z · Cited by 9
Long-arm functional individuation of computation
Fresco, N. (2021) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03407-x · Cited by 9
Why do Qualia and the Mind Seem Nonphysical?
Musacchio, J. M. (2005) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-005-8364-6 · Cited by 8
Analytic Philosophy in America
Soames, S. (2008) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199219315.003.0021 · Cited by 9
Phenomenal Character and the Transparency of Experience
Nida‐Rümelin, M. (2008) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.003.0018 · Cited by 9
Kant’s and Husserl’s agentive and proprietary accounts of cognitive phenomenology
Jansen, J. (2016) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869795.2016.1176233 · Cited by 10
Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities
Byrne, A. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0016 · Cited by 10
Are perspectival shapes seen or imagined? An experimental approach
Schwenkler, J., & Weksler, A. (2018) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-018-9571-1 · Cited by 9
The Meaning of "Look"
Breckenridge, W. (2007) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 9
Philosophy of Perception and the Phenomenology of Visual Space
Hatfield, G. (2011) · PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · Cited by 9
Editorial: Objects and Sound Perception
Bullot, N. J., & Égré, P. (2009) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-009-0006-3 · Cited by 9
THE NATURE OF PHENOMENAL CONTENT
Thompson, B. J. (2003) · UA Campus Repository (The University of Arizona) · Cited by 9
The Three Circles of Consciousness
Kriegel, U. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805397.003.0008 · Cited by 8
Perceiving Intersensory and Emotional Qualities of Everyday Objects: A Study on Smoothness or Sharpness Features with Line Drawings by Designers
Sinico, M., Bertamini, M., & Soranzo, A. (2021) · Art & Perception · doi:10.1163/22134913-bja10026 · Cited by 8
ON THE LOOKS OF THINGS
Overgaard, S. (2010) · Pacific philosophical quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01367.x · Cited by 8
Representationalism and the conceivability of inverted spectra
Thompson, B. (2007) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9110-4 · Cited by 8
Is there a phenomenological argument for higher-order representationalism?
Mehta, N. (2012) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9859-x · Cited by 8
Merleau-Ponty and McDowell on the Transparency of the Mind
Jensen, R. T. (2013) · International Journal of Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1080/09672559.2013.812606 · Cited by 8
Imagination, Embodiment and Situatedness: Using Husserl to Dispel (Some) Notions of ‘Off-Line Thinking’
Jansen, J. (2013) · Contributions to phenomenology · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-01616-0_4 · Cited by 8
Combining the representational and the relational view
Pereira, R. H. D. S. (2016) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0662-y · Cited by 8
Transitivity and Transparency
Gottlieb, J. (2016) · Analytic Philosophy · doi:10.1111/phib.12091 · Cited by 8
Mind-Dependence in Berkeley and the Problem of Perception
Sethi, U. (2020) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2020.1826047 · Cited by 8
Minimal Sense of Self, Temporality and the Brain
Kiverstein, J. D. (2009) · PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness · Cited by 8
In Defense of Wordless Thoughts About Thoughts
Lurz, R. W. (2007) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00309.x · Cited by 8
The Epistemic Parity of Testimony, Memory, and PerceptionPreprint
Green, C. R. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1005782 · Cited by 7
Conscious-State Anti-realism
Mandik, P. (2015) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-17374-0_10 · Cited by 7
The perceived quality of green buildings: from a review of occupant satisfaction towards a conceptual framework
Halıcıoğlu, F. H., & Gurel, K. (2023) · International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management · doi:10.1108/ijqrm-10-2022-0307 · Cited by 11
How representationalism can account for the phenomenal significance of illumination
Jagnow, R. (2009) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-008-9118-y · Cited by 7
Consciousness and Object: A mind-object identity physicalist theory
Manzotti, R. (2017) · Cited by 7
Memory as Sensory Modality, Perception as Experience of the Past
Barkasi, M. (2021) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-021-00598-7 · Cited by 7
Sensory fields: the visual and the bodily
Serrahima, C. (2022) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-022-01838-x · Cited by 7
Reviving the naïve realist approach to memory
Sant’Anna, A., & Barkasi, M. (2022) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2022.9192 · Cited by 7
Achieving Transparency: An Argument For Enactivism
Ward, D. (2015) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12188 · Cited by 7
INTENTIONALITY AND NORMATIVITY
Kriegel, U. (2010) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2010.00182.x · Cited by 7
What is musical intuition? Tonal theory as cognitive science
DeBellis, M. (1999) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/095150899105693 · Cited by 7
Disappearing Appearances: On the Enactive Approach to Spatial Perceptual Content
Jagnow, R. (2008) · The Southern Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2008.tb00069.x · Cited by 7
What are debates about qualia really about?
Speaks, J. (2013) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0176-9 · Cited by 7
The spread mind: is consciousness situated?
Manzotti, R. (2011) · Dialnet (Universidad de la Rioja) · Cited by 7
Representationalism and the problem of vagueness
Perkins, R., & Bayne, T. (2012) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9990-8 · Cited by 7
Content, Illusion, Partition
Gunther, Y. H. (2001) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1023/a:1004700918246 · Cited by 7
The Property Dualism Argument
White, S. L. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0004 · Cited by 7
Some reflections on Husserlian intentionality, intentionalism, and non-propositional contents
van Mazijk, C. (2016) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.2016.1255500 · Cited by 7
Experiencing Emotions
Copenhaver, R., & Odenbaugh, J. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190648916.003.0010 · Cited by 7
Two Theories of Transparency
Averill, E. W., & Gottlieb, J. (2019) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-019-00119-0 · Cited by 6
Teachers’ Perceptions of Open Educational Resources: The Case of Open Resources for English Language Teaching (ORELT) in Kenya
Orwenjo, D. O., & Erastus, F. K. (2021) · Journal of Learning for Development · doi:10.56059/jl4d.v8i3.529 · Cited by 6
Transparency and the Mindfulness Opacity Hypothesis
Lange, V., & Grünbaum, T. (2023) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqad098 · Cited by 6
Theoriebeladenheit und Objektivität
Adam, M. (2002) · De Gruyter eBooks · doi:10.1515/9783110322743 · Cited by 6
Redder and Realer: Responses to Egan and Tye
Cohen, J. (2012) · Analytic Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.2153-960x.2012.00571.x · Cited by 6
Phenomenal intentionality past and present: introductory
Kriegel, U. (2013) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-013-9308-0 · Cited by 6
Objectifying the Phenomenal in Experimental Psychology: Titchener and Beyond
Hatfield, G. (2015) · Philosophia Scientae · doi:10.4000/philosophiascientiae.1133 · Cited by 6
Intentional and Phenomenal Properties: How not to be Inseparatists
Márton, M. (2021) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-021-00362-2 · Cited by 6
Epistemological Objections to Materialism
Koons, R. C. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0014 · Cited by 6
Materialism, Minimal Emergentism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness
Horgan, T. G. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0015 · Cited by 6
Perception Pragmatized: a Pragmatic Reconciliation of Representationalism and Relationalism
Sant’Anna, A. (2017) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-017-9919-8 · Cited by 6
Phenomenal Intentionality
Pitt, D. (2024) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198789901.003.0002 · Cited by 6
On Privations and Their Perception
O’Callaghan, C. (2010) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-010-0101-1 · Cited by 6
PHENOMENAL EXPERIENCE: A CARTESIAN THEATER REVIVAL
Levine, J. (2010) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2010.00188.x · Cited by 8
Direct Realism, Introspection, and Cognitive Science1
Fumerton, R. A. (2006) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00554.x · Cited by 6
Color Relationalism and Relativism
Byrne, A., & Hilbert, D. R. (2017) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/tops.12243 · Cited by 6
Phenomenal consciousness as scientific phenomenon? A critical investigation of the new science of consciousness
Sytsma, J. M. (2010) · D-Scholarship@Pitt (University of Pittsburgh) · Cited by 6
Independent intentional objects
Farkas, K. (2010) · Cited by 6
Perceptual experience : relations and representations/
Logue, H. (2009) · DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) · Cited by 6
Consciousness, Philosophical Issues About
Block, N. J. (2005) · Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/0470018860.s00145 · Cited by 6
The representational theory of consciousness
Bourget, D. (2010) · ANU Open Research (Australian National University) · doi:10.25911/5d51554637284 · Cited by 6
Something about Mary
Talbot, J. D. (2008) · Pain · doi:10.1016/j.pain.2008.09.017 · Cited by 6
Accessibility “in principle”
Chomsky, N. (1990) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00080341 · Cited by 6
Representationalism about Consciousness
Seager, W., & Bourget, D. (2017) · doi:10.1002/9781119132363.ch19 · Cited by 6
Idealism and transparency in Sartre’s ontological proof
Kinkaid, J. (2023) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2023.2172452 · Cited by 5
Husserl, representationalism, and the theory of phenomenal intentionality
Liu, C. (2023) · European Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/ejop.12881 · Cited by 5
Better bridges: Integrating the neuroscience and philosophy of consciousness
Kozuch, B. (2024) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2024.103774 · Cited by 6
Fragmented and conflicted: folk beliefs about vision
Fischer, E., Allen, K., & Engelhardt, P. E. (2023) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04066-w · Cited by 7
Honing the Haptics of the Heart: A New Defence of the Perceptual Theory of Emotion
Yip, B. (2025) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-025-00930-y · Cited by 5
Attention & the indeterminacy of visual experience
Stazicker, J. (2011) · Cited by 5
Intentionality
Forrai, G., & Kampis, G. (2005) · BRILL eBooks · doi:10.1163/9789401202145 · Cited by 5

Authors: Harman, G.
Corresponding author: Harman, Gilbert
Venue: Philosophical Perspectives
Publisher: JSTOR
Published: 1990
Volume: 4
Pages: 31
ISSN: 1520-8583 (ISSN-L)
DOI: 10.2307/2214186
OpenAlex: W2035834232
Cited by: 1,409
References: 18
Citations by year: 2026: 37 · 2025: 70 · 2024: 83 · 2023: 69 · 2022: 94 · 2021: 67 · 2020: 69 · 2019: 86 · 2018: 39 · 2017: 62 · 2016: 50 · 2015: 35 · 2014: 35 · 2013: 46 · 2012: 34
FWCI: 18.62
Type: journal article
Language: en
Open access: closed
Locations: Philosophical Perspectives (publishedVersion)
Topics: Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
Keywords: qualia, inverted spectrum, visual experience, color perception

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

The Intrinsic Quality of Experience

Abstract

Overview

Integrity signals

Verification

Claims the paper makes

Citations

Cites

Cited by

Related

Metadata

Record

About these checks