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The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
Abstract
There are three familiar and related arguments against psychophysical functionalism and the computer model of the mind. The first is that we are directly aware of intrinsic features of our experience and argues that there is no way to account for this awareness in a functional view. The second claims that a person blind from birth can know all about the functional role of visual experience without knowing what it is like to see something red. The third claims that functionalism cannot account for the possibility of an inverted spectrum. All three arguments can be defused by distinguishing properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Harman, G.
- Corresponding author
- Harman, Gilbert
- Venue
- Philosophical Perspectives
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1990
- Volume
- 4
- Pages
- 31
- ISSN
- 1520-8583 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2035834232
- Cited by
- 1,409
- References
- 18
- Citations by year
- 2026: 37 · 2025: 70 · 2024: 83 · 2023: 69 · 2022: 94 · 2021: 67 · 2020: 69 · 2019: 86 · 2018: 39 · 2017: 62 · 2016: 50 · 2015: 35 · 2014: 35 · 2013: 46 · 2012: 34
- FWCI
- 18.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophical Perspectives (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Keywords
- qualia, inverted spectrum, visual experience, color perception
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