Cited by 1,409Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEpistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsMental Health and Psychiatry

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Intrinsic Quality of Experience

Harman, Gilbert·1990·Philosophical Perspectives

Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

There are three familiar and related arguments against psychophysical functionalism and the computer model of the mind. The first is that we are directly aware of intrinsic features of our experience and argues that there is no way to account for this awareness in a functional view. The second claims that a person blind from birth can know all about the functional role of visual experience without knowing what it is like to see something red. The third claims that functionalism cannot account for the possibility of an inverted spectrum. All three arguments can be defused by distinguishing properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2307/2214186

Cites

18 of 18 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Untitled work
(1960) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 5,851
Untitled work
(1987) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 4,269
What Mary Didn't Know
Jackson, F. (1986) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2026143 · Cited by 1,424
Content and Consciousness.
Dent, N. J. H., & Dennett, D. C. (1970) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2217666 · Cited by 1,140
On What There is
Ayer, A. J. (1972) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-00132-3_9 · Cited by 984
Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology
Block, N., & Philosophy Documentation Center (1986) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1987.tb00558.x · Cited by 775
Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States
Churchland, P. M. (1985) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2026509 · Cited by 590
The Inverted Spectrum
Shoemaker, S. (1982) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2026213 · Cited by 468
Perception: A Representative Theory.
ROSENTHAL, D. M., & Jackson, F. (1985) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2026510 · Cited by 270

Flagged first, then by citations

Show all 18 references

Sorted by citations

Items 501–600 of 1,000

Functions and mental representation: the theoretical role of representations and its real nature
Sebastián, M. Á. (2016) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-015-9452-9 · Cited by 5
Materialism Does Not Save the Phenomena—and the Alternative Which Does
Meixner, U. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0021 · Cited by 5
The phenomenology of attitudes and the salience of rational role and determination
Dorsch, F. (2016) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869795.2016.1176231 · Cited by 5
Hume's Table, Peacocke's Trees, the Tilted Penny and the Reversed Seeing‐in Account
Schroer, R. (2017) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12141 · Cited by 5
Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity
Schellenberg, S. (2018) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198827702.003.0007 · Cited by 5
Attenuated Representationalism
Mendelovici, A. (2022) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anac094 · Cited by 5
Emotional Phenomenology: A New Puzzle
Álvarez-González, A. (2023) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-023-09887-1 · Cited by 5
Seeing through Transparency
Bordini, D. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198879466.003.0010 · Cited by 5
How to undercut radical skepticism
Echeverri, S. (2016) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0761-9 · Cited by 5
Locating qualia: do they reside in the brain or in the body and the world?
Hill, C. S. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511687068.007 · Cited by 5
PERCEPTION IN PERSPECTIVE
Schellenberg, S. (2007) · D-Scholarship@Pitt (University of Pittsburgh) · Cited by 5
Phenomenal concepts as bare recognitional concepts: harder to debunk than you thought, …but still possible
Holman, E. L. (2012) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9904-9 · Cited by 5
The representational theory of phenomenal character: A phenomenological critique
Janzen, G. (2006) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-006-9020-4 · Cited by 5
Intellect and Concept
Rattan, G. (2009) · The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition Logic and Communication · doi:10.4148/biyclc.v5i0.288 · Cited by 5
Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot
Sundström, P. (2007) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9084-1 · Cited by 5
Are There Pure Conscious Events
Gennaro, R. J. (2008) · Cited by 6
Soul, Mind, and Brain
Leftow, B. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0020 · Cited by 5
The Self‐Consciousness Argument: Functionalism and the Corruption of Content
Bealer, G. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0006 · Cited by 5
Perception, technology, and life-worlds
村田, 純. (2007) · Cited by 5
Functional Mechanisms
Piccinini, G. (2020) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198866282.003.0004 · Cited by 5
Mind and Consciousness
Frankish, K., & Kasmirli, M. (2009) · doi:10.1002/9781444315837.ch8 · Cited by 5
Minds, Machines and Qualia: A Theory of Consciousness
Cowell, C. W. (2001) · Cited by 4
The problem of higher-order misrepresentation
Peebles, G. (2021) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2021.2016677 · Cited by 4
On noticing transparent states: A compatibilist approach to transparency
Dewalque, A. (2022) · European Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1111/ejop.12806 · Cited by 4
Dreams, Remembering, and Remembering Dreams: An Intentionalist, Direct Realist, Acquaintance Account
Copenhaver, R. (2024) · Synthese Library/Synthese library · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-68204-9_2 · Cited by 4
Constitutive Self-Consciousness
Millière, R. (2024) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2024.2417750 · Cited by 4
Mnemic scenarios as pictures
Liefke, K. (2025) · Asian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s44204-025-00288-6 · Cited by 4
Losing grip on the world: from illusion to sense-data
Brown, D. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511979279.004 · Cited by 4
Locating projectivism in intentionalism debates
Brown, D. (2010) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9509-0 · Cited by 4
Acerca da taxonomia do mental para contextos que requerem neutralidade
Lazzeri, F. (2012) · Principia an international journal of epistemology · doi:10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n3p365 · Cited by 4
Perceptual Justification Outside of Consciousness
Berger, J. (2013) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6001-1_12 · Cited by 4
On doing research on consciousness without being aware of it
Holender, D. (1990) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00080468 · Cited by 4
Functionalism
Gulick, R. V. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0008 · Cited by 4
Subjective Facts about Consciousness
Lipman, M. A. (2023) · Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.3998/ergo.4649 · Cited by 4
Retinal Images and Object Files: Towards Empirically Evaluating Philosophical Accounts of Visual Perspective
Weksler, A. (2015) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-015-0239-2 · Cited by 4
Explaining representation: a reply to Matthen
Egan, F. (2013) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0166-y · Cited by 4
Does Experience Have Phenomenal Properties?
Lee, G. (2016) · Philosophical Topics · doi:10.5840/philtopics201644223 · Cited by 4
Keeping Students Out of Mary’s (Class)room
Brock, R., & Hay, D. B. (2019) · Science & Education · doi:10.1007/s11191-019-00079-5 · Cited by 5
Directing internal attention towards ongoing thought
Fortney, M. (2020) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2020.103025 · Cited by 4
First-Person Perspective in Experience: Perspectival De Se Representation as an Explanation of the Delimitation Problem
Sebastián, M. Á. (2022) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-022-00564-4 · Cited by 4
Perceptual Transparency and Perceptual Constancy
Almäng, J. (2013) · Husserl Studies · doi:10.1007/s10743-013-9142-9 · Cited by 4
Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism: Putting a New Spin on the Knowledge Argument
Holman, E. L. (2006) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-004-7791-4 · Cited by 4
Phenomenal consciousness, representational content and cognitive access: a missing link between two debates
Jacobson, H. (2014) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-014-9399-2 · Cited by 5
Language and the deep unconscious mind: Aspectualities of the theory of syntax
Dresher, B. E., & Hornstein, N. (1990) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00080377 · Cited by 4
Does the Phenomenality of Perceptual Experience Present an Obstacle to Phenomenal Externalism?
Schroer, R. (2009) · Philosophical Papers · doi:10.1080/05568640902933494 · Cited by 4
Intentionality: Some distinctions
Harman, G. H. (1990) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00080420 · Cited by 4
Self-citation
El problema de la conciencia para la filosofía de la mente y de la psiquiatría
Brigard, F. D. (2017) · Ideas y Valores · doi:10.15446/ideasyvalores.v66n3supl.65652 · Cited by 4
Husserl, impure intentionalism, and sensory awareness
van Mazijk, C. (2018) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-018-9558-y · Cited by 4
How to Analyze (Intentional) Consciousness in Terms of Meta-Belief and Temporal Awareness
Beyer, C. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01628 · Cited by 5
An example of access-consciousness without phenomenal consciousness?
Bogen, J. E. (1997) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x97000058 · Cited by 5
University Leadership for Sustainability: an Active Dendritic Framework for Enabling Connection and Collaboration
Williams, P. M. (2008) · doi:10.26686/wgtn.16946005.v1 · Cited by 4
Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Appraisal and Application
Lyyra, P. (2010) · Jyväskylä University Digital Archive (University of Jyväskylä) · Cited by 4
When functions are causes
Schull, J. (1990) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00080559 · Cited by 4
Searle's vision of psychology
Higginbotham, J. (1990) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00080432 · Cited by 4
An empirical case against materialismPreprint
Clifton, A. (2004) · CogPrints (University of Southampton) · Cited by 4
Consciousness as physiological self-organizing process
Freeman, W. J. (1990) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00080390 · Cited by 4
Intrinsic theory and the content of inner awareness
Kriegel, U. (2003) · The Journal of mind and behavior · Cited by 4
Empirical Evidence Against Phenomenal Theses
Ozdemir, E. (2022) · Open Access Victoria University of Wellington | Te Herenga Waka (Figshare) · doi:10.26686/wgtn.19070153 · Cited by 5
How to resist the Fading Qualia Argument
Mogensen, A. L. (2025) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-025-05338-3 · Cited by 3
Practical perceptual representations: a contemporary defense of an old idea
Springle, A. A., & Buccella, A. (2024) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04463-1 · Cited by 3
Spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is impossible
Speaks, J. (2010) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9607-z · Cited by 3
Therapeutic Reflections on Our Bipolar History of Perception
Pasnau, R. (2016) · Analytic Philosophy · doi:10.1111/phib.12080 · Cited by 3
Transparency, representationalism, and visual noise
Gert, J. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02480-7 · Cited by 3
The generality and particularity of perception
Schellenberg, S. (2022) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12414 · Cited by 3
Varieties of representationalism and their approach to sensory experience
Kevin, K. (2014) · Philosophical Papers and Review · doi:10.5897/ppr12.025 · Cited by 3
How to know one’s experiences transparently
Hofmann, F. (2018) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1064-0 · Cited by 3
The global workspace theory, the phenomenal concept strategy, and the distribution of consciousness
Black, D. (2020) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2020.102992 · Cited by 3
Information-Theoretic Adverbialism
Gert, J. (2020) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2020.1809477 · Cited by 3
The First Computational Theory of Cognition
Piccinini, G. (2020) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198866282.003.0006 · Cited by 3
It’s Still There!
Hellie, B. (2013) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6001-1_11 · Cited by 3
René Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy
ROSENTHAL, D. M. (2014) · Topoi · doi:10.1007/s11245-014-9270-7 · Cited by 3
An adverbialist–objectualist account of pain
Janzen, G. (2012) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-012-9289-4 · Cited by 5
Some arguments against intentionalism
Kuczynski, J.-M. (2004) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-004-1005-8 · Cited by 3
A Defense of McDowell’s Response to the Sceptic
Langsam, H. (2013) · Acta Analytica · doi:10.1007/s12136-013-0188-2 · Cited by 3
The Goldilocks Problem of the specificity of visual phenomenal content
Schroer, R. (2014) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00455091.2014.985067 · Cited by 3
Exploring Subjective Representationalism
Mehta, N. (2012) · Pacific philosophical quarterly · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2012.01439.x · Cited by 3
Phenomenal Adequacy and Introspective Evidence
Spener, M. (2007) · Cited by 3
What is Really Wrong with Representationalism
Klausen, S. H. (2004) · University of Southern Denmark Research Portal (University of Southern Denmark) · Cited by 3
Intention itself will disappear when its mechanisms are known
Bridgeman, B. (1990) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00080328 · Cited by 3
The Introspectibility of Brain States as Such
Mandik, P. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139165280.004 · Cited by 3
Against Methodological Materialism
Menuge, A. J. L. (2010) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199556182.003.0019 · Cited by 3
The Strength of the Mind: Essays on Consciousness and Introspection
Morales, J. (2018) · doi:10.7916/d82249sw · Cited by 3
Cognitive self-management requires the phenomenal registration of intrinsic state properties
Peters, F. (2019) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-018-01237-1 · Cited by 3
An Analytic-Hermeneutic History of Consciousness
Hellie, B. (2019) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781316779651.008 · Cited by 3
An Empirical Solution to the Puzzle of Macbeth’s Dagger
D’Ambrosio, J. (2020) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-020-00253-0 · Cited by 3
Perceived security: An experimental study of security doors
Sinico, M. (2021) · Safety Science · doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2021.105252 · Cited by 3
Philosophical Analysis
Heil, J. (2003) · doi:10.1093/0199259747.003.0006 · Cited by 3
Matching Sensible Qualities: A Skeleton in the Closet for Representationalism
Schroer, R. (2002) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1023/a:1014534812338 · Cited by 3
Puzzling Pain Conditions: How Philosophy Can Help Us Understand Them
Witonsky, A., & Whitman, S. M. (2005) · Pain Medicine · doi:10.1111/j.1526-4637.2005.00046.x · Cited by 3
The Scrambler: An Argument Against Representationalism
Biggs, S. (2009) · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1353/cjp.0.0046 · Cited by 3
Lessons in smelling : essays on olfactory perception
Batty, C. (2007) · DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) · Cited by 3
The neurophysiology of consicousness and the unconscious
Skarda, C. A. (1990) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00080572 · Cited by 3
Content externalism and phenomenal character: a new worry about privileged access
Ellis, J. (2006) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9067-3 · Cited by 3
The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness
Prosser, S. (2006) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-005-4281-2 · Cited by 3
Somebody flew over Searle's ontological prison
Piattelli‐Palmarini, M. (1990) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00080523 · Cited by 3
Accounting for Pure Consciousness: An Examination of the Ability of the Representationalist Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness to Account for Pure Consciousness Experiences
Bachmann, J. K. (2014) · ERA: Education and Research Archive (University of Alberta) · doi:10.7939/r32v2cj7z · Cited by 3
Functionalism and Qualia
Gulick, R. V. (2017) · doi:10.1002/9781119132363.ch31 · Cited by 3
Capacities‐First Philosophy
Schellenberg, S. (2023) · doi:10.1002/9781394259847.ch23 · Cited by 3
A New Acquaintance Theory of Introspection
Duncan, M. (2026) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.70097 · Cited by 2
Not every feeling is intentional
Farkas, K. (2009) · Open Research (Auckland University of Technology) · Cited by 2

Authors: Harman, G.
Corresponding author: Harman, Gilbert
Venue: Philosophical Perspectives
Publisher: JSTOR
Published: 1990
Volume: 4
Pages: 31
ISSN: 1520-8583 (ISSN-L)
DOI: 10.2307/2214186
OpenAlex: W2035834232
Cited by: 1,409
References: 18
Citations by year: 2026: 37 · 2025: 70 · 2024: 83 · 2023: 69 · 2022: 94 · 2021: 67 · 2020: 69 · 2019: 86 · 2018: 39 · 2017: 62 · 2016: 50 · 2015: 35 · 2014: 35 · 2013: 46 · 2012: 34
FWCI: 18.62
Type: journal article
Language: en
Open access: closed
Locations: Philosophical Perspectives (publishedVersion)
Topics: Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
Keywords: qualia, inverted spectrum, visual experience, color perception

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

The Intrinsic Quality of Experience

Abstract

Overview

Integrity signals

Verification

Claims the paper makes

Citations

Cites

Cited by

Related

Metadata

Record

About these checks