The Intentionality All-Stars
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
All-star conundrum: How do you handle a streaking Pirate with three balls on him? Metaphysical answer: Walk him intentionally, and pitch to the Padre.1 The traditional philosophical credentials of this strategy are impeccable; for, although Hobbes was prepared to argue walk, therefore I am, Descartes held out for the more explicit walk intentionally, ...2 His point, of course, was that, unlike mere corporeal walking, intending is a kind of cognition-it has, in his terms, not only formal but also objective reality. And this ostensibly distinctive character of cognitions has remained a topic of active investigation ever since-though now under the title intentionality.3 Remarkably, however, neither Hobbes nor Descartes nor, indeed, any of their successors ever noticed the significance of baseball for the alternatives and their explication. I shall attempt to remedy that startling omission.
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Citations
Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Searle, J. R. (1980) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00005756 · Cited by 6,954
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Block, N., & Philosophy Documentation Center (1986) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1987.tb00558.x · Cited by 775
Cited by
Ramstead, M. J. D., Veissière, S. P. L., & Kirmayer, L. J. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01090 · Cited by 422
“Semantics is an intensional notion (Millikan, 1984, 2004, 2005; Haugeland, 1990; Piccinini, 2015).”
Agency: The Relation between Meaning, Power, and Knowledge
Kockelman, P. (2007) · Current Anthropology · doi:10.1086/512998 · Cited by 196
“While both assertions and promises, as well as beliefs and intentions, exhibit intentionality, there are long-standing battles regarding which kind of intentionality (the psychological kind or the linguistic kind) is originary and which is derivative (Haugeland 1998).”
BackgroundPragmatism and the predictive mind
Williams, D. (2018) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-017-9556-5 · Cited by 22
“Only in virtue of such culturally instituted roles can tokens have contents at all^ (Haugeland 1990, 404).”
BackgroundInfluentialSkilled we-intentionality: Situating joint action in the living environment
Kiverstein, J., & Rietveld, E. (2021) · Open Research Europe · doi:10.12688/openreseurope.13411.2 · Cited by 15
Being Clear on Content - Commentary on Hutto and Satne
Coelho Mollo, D. (2015) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-015-9622-6 · Cited by 3
“Such practices may consist, for example, in conforming to the ways of living of a society (Haugeland 1990), or in reasongiving to 5 Burge (2010), p. 432.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Haugeland, J.
- Venue
- Philosophical Perspectives
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1990
- Volume
- 4
- Pages
- 383
- ISSN
- 1520-8583 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2329010901
- Cited by
- 141
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 0.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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