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Pragmatism and the predictive mind

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Williams, Daniel · 2018 · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 80 of the 81 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Predictive processing and its apparent commitment to explaining cognition in terms of Bayesian inference over hierarchical generative models seems to flatly contradict the pragmatist conception of mind and experience. Against this, I argue that this appearance results from philosophical overlays at odd with the science itself, and that the two frameworks are in fact well-poised for mutually beneficial theoretical exchange. Specifically, I argue: first, that predictive processing illuminates pragmatism’s commitment to both the primacy of pragmatic coping in accounts of the mind and the profound organism-relativity of experience; second, that this pragmatic, “narcissistic” character of prediction error minimization undermines its ability to explain the distinctive normativity of intentionality; and third, that predictive processing therefore mandates an extra-neural account of intentional content of exactly the sort that pragmatism’s communitarian vision of human thought can provide.

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Research works printed but not linked: 19

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Metadata

Authors
Williams, D.
Affiliations
University of Cambridge (GB)
Corresponding author
Williams, Daniel
Venue
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Published
2018-01-13
Volume
17
Issue
5
Pages
835-859
ISSN
  • 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
  • 1572-8676
OpenAlex
W2783917573
Cited by
22
References
81
Citations by year
2025: 6 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 4
FWCI
1.34
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
  • cc-by
  • creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
Locations
  • Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Apollo (University of Cambridge) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Apollo (cc-by)
Funders
Arts and Humanities Research Council
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education
Keywords
predictive processing, pragmatism, prediction error minimization, Bayesian inference, hierarchical generative models, intentionality, intentional content, communitarianism, philosophy of mind, philosophy of perception

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Williams, D. (2018). Pragmatism and the predictive mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-017-9556-5

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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