Pragmatism and the predictive mind
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 80 of the 81 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Predictive processing and its apparent commitment to explaining cognition in terms of Bayesian inference over hierarchical generative models seems to flatly contradict the pragmatist conception of mind and experience. Against this, I argue that this appearance results from philosophical overlays at odd with the science itself, and that the two frameworks are in fact well-poised for mutually beneficial theoretical exchange. Specifically, I argue: first, that predictive processing illuminates pragmatism’s commitment to both the primacy of pragmatic coping in accounts of the mind and the profound organism-relativity of experience; second, that this pragmatic, “narcissistic” character of prediction error minimization undermines its ability to explain the distinctive normativity of intentionality; and third, that predictive processing therefore mandates an extra-neural account of intentional content of exactly the sort that pragmatism’s communitarian vision of human thought can provide.
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“Second, while Williams [76] shows that cognition is always pragmatically oriented toward action rather than passive representation, Haraldsen [27] emphasizes that AI systems often embody agential forces that diverge from user intentions.”
From 4E cognition and the coevolution of human–AI interaction (2025) · cites this paper as [76]
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Cited by
Ramstead, M. J. D., Friston, K. J., & Hipólito, I. (2020) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e22080889 · Cited by 103
Williams, D. (2020) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-1768-x · Cited by 63
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Guardrails for Human-AI Ecologies: Norm-Based Coordination and Design for Predictability
Grisold, T., Berente, N., & Seidel, S. (2025) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.25300/misq/2025/18058 · Cited by 32
Hierarchical minds and the perception/cognition distinction
Williams, D. (2019) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2019.1610045 · Cited by 31
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Metadata
- Authors
- Williams, D.
- Affiliations
- University of Cambridge (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Williams, Daniel
- ORCID
- Williams, Daniel
- Venue
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Published
- 2018-01-13
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 835-859
- ISSN
- 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8676
- OpenAlex
- W2783917573
- Cited by
- 22
- References
- 81
- Citations by year
- 2025: 6 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 4
- FWCI
- 1.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- Locations
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Apollo (University of Cambridge) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Apollo (cc-by)
- Funders
- Arts and Humanities Research Council
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education
- Keywords
- predictive processing, pragmatism, prediction error minimization, Bayesian inference, hierarchical generative models, intentionality, intentional content, communitarianism, philosophy of mind, philosophy of perception
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