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Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy
Abstract
Robert Sugden; Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy, The Economic Journal, Volume 101, Issue 407, 1 July 1991, Pages 751–785
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Metadata
- Authors
- Sugden, R.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1991-07
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 407
- Pages
- 751
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1998712070
- Cited by
- 450
- References
- 46
- FWCI
- 4.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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