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A Theory of Privatisation
Abstract
Public enterprises around the world have proved to be highly inefficient, primarily because they pursue strategies, such as excess employment, that satisfy the political objectives of politicians who control them. Privatisation of public enterprises can raise the cost to politicians of influencing them, since subsidies to private firms necessary to force them to remain inefficient are politically harder to sustain than wasted profits of the state firms. In this way, privatisation leads to efficient restructuring of firms. Moreover, privatisation is more effective when combined with a tight monetary policy, and when the new owners of firms are profit maximising investors, rather than their employees or even managers.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Boycko, M., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W.
- Venue
- The Economic Journal
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1996-03
- Volume
- 106
- Issue
- 435
- Pages
- 309
- ISSN
- 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2006885981
- Cited by
- 1,194
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 86.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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