The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
Open accessAbstract
There is an extensive empirical literature on political business cycles, but its theoretical foundations are grounded in pre-rational expectations macroeconomic theory. Here we show that electoral cycles in taxes, government spending and money growth can be modeled as an equilibrium signaling process. The cycle is driven by temporary information asymmetries which can arise if, for example, the government has more current information on its performance in providing for national defence. Incumbents cheat least when their private information is either extremely favourable or extremely unfavourable. An exogeneous increase in the incumbent party's popularity does not necessarily imply a damped policy cycle.
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Citations
Cites
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Reputation and imperfect information
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8 · Cited by 3,087
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Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948-1984Preprint
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Cited by
Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: some comparative evidence
Alesina, A., & Summers, L. H. (1993) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/2077833 · Cited by 1,833
Voting for autocracy: hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.44-4695 · Cited by 1,155
The Case for Restricting Fiscal Policy Discretion
Fatas, A., & Mihov, I. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355303322552838 · Cited by 766
Fiscal Expansions and Adjustments in OECD Countries
Alesina, A., Perotti, R., Giavazzi, F., & Kollintzas, T. (1995) · Economic Policy · doi:10.2307/1344590 · Cited by 764
A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage
Groseclose, T. (2001) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669329 · Cited by 754
Metadata
- Authors
- Rogoff, K., & Sibert, A.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1988-01
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2046642512
- Cited by
- 1,607
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 45.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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