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Cited by 261

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Strategic Promotion and Compensation

Bernhardt, D.·1995·The Review of Economic Studies
DOI 10.2307/2297807
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Abstract

Within a hierarchical firm structure, this paper details how the composition of a worker's skills and the non-observability of a worker's ability affect wage and promotion paths. Promotion-based compensation schemes derive naturally from the worker's asymmetrically observed ability. Promotion takes place over time and is inefficient since employers strategically exploit their knowledge of an able worker's ability. Conversely, employers may be unable to efficiently demote and retain bad managers without paying bonuses. Employers are led to promote educated employees before their equally or more able, but uneducated, counterparts. Explanations for fast-track promotions plans, and other empirical regularities are provided.

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Crossref · 10.2307/2297807

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Metadata

Authors
Bernhardt, D.
Venue
The Review of Economic Studies
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
1995-04-01
Volume
62
Issue
2
Pages
315-339
ISSN
  • 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-937X
DOI
10.2307/2297807
OpenAlex
W2049387462
Cited by
261
References
24
FWCI
3.37
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Strategic Promotion and Compensation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2297807
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Bernhardt, D. (1995). Strategic Promotion and Compensation. The Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297807

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.