The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Strategic Promotion and Compensation
Abstract
Within a hierarchical firm structure, this paper details how the composition of a worker's skills and the non-observability of a worker's ability affect wage and promotion paths. Promotion-based compensation schemes derive naturally from the worker's asymmetrically observed ability. Promotion takes place over time and is inefficient since employers strategically exploit their knowledge of an able worker's ability. Conversely, employers may be unable to efficiently demote and retain bad managers without paying bonuses. Employers are led to promote educated employees before their equally or more able, but uneducated, counterparts. Explanations for fast-track promotions plans, and other empirical regularities are provided.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Schooling, Experience, and Earnings
Mincer, J. (1974) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 6,840
Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory
BAKER, G. P., JENSEN, M. C., & MURPHY, K. J. (1988) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04593.x · Cited by 1,702
Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings
Rosen, S. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003456 · Cited by 1,202
The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data
Baker, G., Gibbs, M., & Holmstrom, B. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118351 · Cited by 843
Will Affirmative Action Policies Eliminate Negative Stereotypes
Coate, S., & Loury, G. C. (1992) · American Economic Review · Cited by 826
Pay and Organizational Effectiveness: A Psychological View.
Lazarus, H., & Lawler, E. E. (1972) · Industrial and Labor Relations Review · doi:10.2307/2521335 · Cited by 823
Harris, M., & Holmstrom, B. (1982) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297359 · Cited by 812
Specific Capital, Mobility, and Wages: Wages Rise with Job Seniority
Topel, R. (1990) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w3294 · Cited by 721
Experience, Performance, and Earnings
Medoff, J. L., & Abraham, K. G. (1980) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885488 · Cited by 654
Do Wages Rise With Job Seniority?
Altonji, J., & Shakotko, R. (1985) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w1616 · Cited by 521
Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency
Waldman, M. (1984) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555679 · Cited by 518
Male-Female Wage Differentials in Job Ladders
Lazear, E. P., & Rosen, S. (1990) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/298246 · Cited by 427
Hierarchy, Ability, and Income Distribution
Calvo, G. A., & Wellisz, S. (1979) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260809 · Cited by 288
Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis
Milgrom, P., & Oster, S. M. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884213 · Cited by 273
Two-Sided Uncertainty and "Up-or-Out" Contracts
Kahn, C., & Huberman, G. (1988) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/298190 · Cited by 265
Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective
Waldman, M. (1990) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/298221 · Cited by 258
Comparative Advantage and the Distributions of Earnings and Abilities
Sattinger, M. (1975) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914276 · Cited by 251
Incentive compensation in a corporate hierarchy
Gibbs, M. (1995) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(94)00384-h · Cited by 241
Learning from Coarse Information: Biased Contests and Career Profiles
Meyer, M. A. (1991) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2298043 · Cited by 171
Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions
Costa, J. E. R. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911081 · Cited by 129
Wages as Sorting Mechanisms in Competitive Markets with Asymmetric Information: A Theory of Testing
Guasch, J. L., & Weiss, A. (1980) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296934 · Cited by 68
Career development and specific human capital collection
Prendergast, C. J. (1992) · Journal of the Japanese and International Economies · doi:10.1016/0889-1583(92)90021-u · Cited by 64
Baker, G. P., Gibbs, M. J., & Holmstrom, B. R. (1993) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/0014-2921(93)90025-6 · Cited by 55
Transactions Costs and Internal Labor Markets
Rosen, S. (1987) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w2407 · Cited by 29
Cited by
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms
Gibbons, R., & Waldman, M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556287 · Cited by 460
BLAU, F. D., & DEVARO, J. (2007) · Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society · doi:10.1111/j.1468-232x.2007.00479.x · Cited by 317
Power in the Firm and Managerial Career Concerns
Ortega, J. (2003) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00001.x · Cited by 39
Metadata
- Authors
- Bernhardt, D.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1995-04-01
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 315-339
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W2049387462
- Cited by
- 261
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 3.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.