The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
Abstract
We study the competition between two political parties for seats in a legislature. The parties have fixed positions on some issues, but vary their positions on others in order to attract votes and campaign contributions. In this context, we examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving, and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms. We show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups. The party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests.
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Citations
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Cited by
Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions
Claessens, S., Feijen, E., & Laeven, L. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.11.003 · Cited by 1,724
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.703 · Cited by 1,319
Persistence of power, Elites, and institutions
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.1.267 · Cited by 1,268
Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels
Bardhan, P., & Mookherjee, D. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.2.135 · Cited by 1,060
New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development
Lin, J. Y. (2011) · The World Bank Research Observer · doi:10.1093/wbro/lkr007 · Cited by 769
Metadata
- Authors
- Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1996-04
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 265
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3023117367
- Cited by
- 1,036
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 26.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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