The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
Open accessAbstract
This paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long-run player whose choice of stage-game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents. We obtain lower and upper bounds on the long-run player's payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the game. If the long-run player's stage-game strategy is statistically identified by the observed outcomes, then for generic payoffs the upper and lower bounds both converge, as the discount factor tends to 1, to the long-run player's Stackelberg payoff, which is the most he could obtain by publicly committing himself to any strategy.
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Citations
Cites
Reputation and imperfect information
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8 · Cited by 3,087
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model
Harsanyi, J. C. (2004) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1040.0270 · Cited by 2,127
Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90031-x · Cited by 1,846
A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information
Cukierman, A., & Meltzer, A. H. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912324 · Cited by 1,286
Selten, R. (1988) · Theory and Decision Library C · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7774-8_2 · Cited by 917
Discrete Parameter Martingales
(2006) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-0-387-35434-7_14 · Cited by 682
Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
Milgrom, P., & Weber, R. J. (1985) · Mathematics of Operations Research · doi:10.1287/moor.10.4.619 · Cited by 557
Loève, M. (1978) · Graduate Texts in Mathematics · doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-6257-2 · Cited by 545
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. K. (1989) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913771 · Cited by 482
Self-citationCooperation and bounded recall
Aumann, R. J., & Sorin, S. (1989) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/0899-8256(89)90003-1 · Cited by 219
On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
Fudenberg, D., Kreps, D. M., & Levine, D. K. (1988) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(88)90009-9 · Cited by 160
Self-citationRepeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
Drew Fudenberg, B., Kreps, D. M., & Maskin, E. S. (1990) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2298086 · Cited by 155
Cited by
The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms
Dellarocas, C. (2003) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.49.10.1407.17308 · Cited by 3,433
Levina, N., & Ross, J. W. (2003) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/30036537 · Cited by 699
Mailath, G. J., & Samuelson, L. (2001) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00175 · Cited by 436
Höner, J. (2002) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/00028280260136444 · Cited by 337
Commitment and observability in games
Bagwell, K. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80001-6 · Cited by 301
Metadata
- Authors
- Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. K.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1992-07
- Volume
- 59
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 561
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1554995057
- Cited by
- 310
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 3.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.