The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance.
Abstract
In a broad-based democracy, not all contracts will survive. Even some efficient contracts will be banned, if enough people dislike them. Thus if the average voter dislikes powerful private financial institutions, politics will, all else being equal, ban them. Interest groups cancel one another out. One group wants powerful financial institutions and another, such as small-town bankers, does not. The small-town bankers have a leg up in the political infighting, because popular opinion is on their side, leading to a ban on some arrangements that a less regulated economy might produce. Or, to recast the problem in agency cost terms, managers would like to be free from the oversight that powerful financial intermediaries might provide, and in the modern era, politicians might side with managers when the managers’ goals of thwarting takeovers align with a public wary of too many hostile takeovers. The politician can satisfy the managerial interest group and be popular at the same time. Agency costs move into the political arena; some contracts are banned, and whether the substitutes that arise are always perfect ones, without additional costs, is an open question. Law restricted the dominant financial institutions from the end of the nineteenth century onward. American banks were fragmented geographically, lacking the size to take big slices of capital of the large American firms emerging at the end of the nineteenth century. Banks’ products and portfolios have been further restricted: they were barred from the securities business and from owning stock. Their affiliates were also restricted in the stock they could own. Insurers could not buy stock for most of this century. Mutual funds cannot easily devote their portfolios to big blocks and face legal problems if they go into the boardroom. Pensions cannot take very big blocks without legal and structural problems; the big private pensions are under managerial control, not the other way around. These rule were neither random nor economically inevitable. While public interest goals of keeping financial intermediaries prudent and stable explain some of the rules, they do not explain all of them. Two dominant themes lay behind many of the rules: American public opinion, which mistrusted private large accumulations of power, and interest group politics. There were winners in fragmenting financial institutions. These winners had a large voice in Congress, and their goals matched public opinion. For example, small banks wanted to shackle large ones and succeeded in getting and keeping branching limits, banks on banks in the securities business, banks on bank affiliates’ moving outside of banking, and deposit insurance (which, by guaranteeing depositors that they will be paid if the bank fails, helps smaller, weaker banks more than it helps more solid, often bigger banks). These features of the political economy of American finance became foundational for corporate finance and the separation of ownership from control.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025
Campbell, J. L. (2007) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2007.25275684 · Cited by 4,906
Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence
Levine, R. (2004) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w10766 · Cited by 3,545
The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (2003) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00125-9 · Cited by 3,327
Chapter 12 Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence
Levine, R. (2005) · Handbook of Economic Growth · doi:10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01012-9 · Cited by 2,889
The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey
Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.1.58 · Cited by 2,358
Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., & Wells, M. T. (1998) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00003-8 · Cited by 2,196
The Handbook of Economic Sociology
Fukuyama, F., Smelser, N. J., & Swedberg, R. (1994) · Foreign Affairs · doi:10.2307/20046937 · Cited by 2,096
Corporate Ownership Around the World
La Porta, R., Lopez de Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1998) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.103130 · Cited by 1,902
The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants
Aguilera, R. V., & Jackson, G. (2003) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2003.10196772 · Cited by 1,607
Venture capital and the structure of capital markets: banks versus stock markets
Black, B. S., & Gilson, R. J. (1998) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(97)00045-7 · Cited by 1,395
Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia
EDMANS, A. (2009) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01508.x · Cited by 1,258
The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice
Admati, A. R., & Pfleiderer, P. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhp037 · Cited by 907
Corporate Governance and Control
Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Röell, A. (2003) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/s1574-0102(03)01005-7 · Cited by 795
Vive La Résistance: Competing Logics and the Consolidation of U.S. Community Banking
Marquis, C., & Lounsbury, M. (2007) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2007.26279172 · Cited by 677
INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION AND STATUS MOBILITY: THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE FIELD OF FINANCE.
Lounsbury, M. (2002) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/3069295 · Cited by 666
Were the Good Old Days That Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression
Holderness, C. G., Kroszner, R. S., & Sheehan, D. P. (1999) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00114 · Cited by 644
The Small World of Germany and the Durability of National Networks
Kogut, B., & Walker, G. (2001) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.1177/000312240106600301 · Cited by 502
Connecting the Dots: Bringing External Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle
Aguilera, R. V., Desender, K. A., Bednar, M. K., & Lee, J. H. (2015) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416520.2015.1024503 · Cited by 502
Enqvist, J., Graham, M., & Nikkinen, J. (2014) · Research in International Business and Finance · doi:10.1016/j.ribaf.2014.03.005 · Cited by 483
A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control
Bebchuk, L. A. (1999) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7203 · Cited by 449
How and why capitalisms differ
Boyer, R. (2005) · Economy and Society · doi:10.1080/03085140500277070 · Cited by 410
Klein, P. G. (1998) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.115811 · Cited by 404
Lehmann, E., & Weigand, J. (2000) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1023/a:1009896709767 · Cited by 403
Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation for Corporate Social Responsibility
Hong, B., Li, Z., & Minor, D. (2016) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-015-2962-0 · Cited by 397
Is integrated reporting determined by a country's legal system? An exploratory study
Frías-Aceituno, J. V., Rodríguez-Ariza, L., & García-Sánchez, I. M. (2013) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2012.12.006 · Cited by 388
Bankers on Boards: Monitoring, Conflicts of Interest, and Lender Liability
Kroszner, R., & Strahan, P. (1999) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7319 · Cited by 369
The Political Economy of Finance
Pagano, M. (2001) · Oxford Review of Economic Policy · doi:10.1093/oxrep/17.4.502 · Cited by 335
New Directions in Corporate Governance
Davis, G. F. (2005) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.31.041304.122249 · Cited by 326
Law, Endowments and Property Rights
Levine, R. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533005774357842 · Cited by 303
Impact of the Institutional Macro Context on the Voluntary Disclosure of CSR Information
Garcia-Sanchez, I.-M., Cuadrado-Ballesteros, B., & Frias-Aceituno, J.-V. (2016) · Long Range Planning · doi:10.1016/j.lrp.2015.02.004 · Cited by 284
Global corporate governance: On the relevance of firms’ ownership structure
Aguilera, R. V., & Crespi-Cladera, R. (2016) · Journal of World Business · doi:10.1016/j.jwb.2015.10.003 · Cited by 277
Assessing Transformation Pathways
(2015) · Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change · doi:10.1017/cbo9781107415416.012 · Cited by 159
Jackson, G., & Deeg, R. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.896384 · Cited by 262
Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control
Roe, M. J. (2000) · Stanford Law Review · doi:10.2307/1229469 · Cited by 262
Self-citationThe Wizards of Oz: Towards an Institutional Approach to Elites, Expertise and Command Posts
Zald, M. N., & Lounsbury, M. (2010) · Organization Studies · doi:10.1177/0170840610373201 · Cited by 258
Accountability and corporate governance of public private partnerships
Shaoul, J., Stafford, A., & Stapleton, P. (2012) · Critical Perspectives on Accounting · doi:10.1016/j.cpa.2011.12.006 · Cited by 241
A New Look at Oligopoly: Implicit Collusion Through Portfolio Diversification
Azar, J. (2012) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1993364 · Cited by 87
Tian, Q., Liu, Y., & Fan, J. (2015) · Journal of Management & Organization · doi:10.1017/jmo.2015.14 · Cited by 83
The Present Crisis. A Trump for a Renewed Political Economy
Boyer, R. (2013) · Review of Political Economy · doi:10.1080/09538259.2013.736262 · Cited by 50
Delistings and the costs of governance: a study of European stock exchanges 1996–2004
Thomsen, S., & Vinten, F. (2014) · Journal of Management & Governance · doi:10.1007/s10997-013-9256-7 · Cited by 40
Metadata
- Authors
- Poulsen, A. B., & Roe, M. J.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1995-06
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 764
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3126012335
- Cited by
- 536
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 98.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.