The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Auditor As an Economic Agent
Abstract
Auditing, Modelling, Economic agents
Overview
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Citations
Cites
Theory of games and economic behavior
(2019) · 100 Years of Math Milestones · doi:10.1090/mbk/121/32 · Cited by 16,632
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Selten, R. (1975) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01766400 · Cited by 3,337
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Myerson, R. B. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912346 · Cited by 1,983
Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90073-5 · Cited by 942
Gjesdal, F. (1981) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2490970 · Cited by 418
Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard
Lambert, R. A. (1983) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003645 · Cited by 321
A Theory of Monopoly Pricing Schemes with Demand Uncertainty
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1981) · American Economic Review · Cited by 221
28. Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Infinite Extensive Games
Aumann, R. J. (1964) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400882014-029 · Cited by 217
An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge
Milgrom, P. (1981) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911137 · Cited by 96
Cited by
Contracting theory and accounting
Lambert, R. A. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00037-4 · Cited by 1,050
A Model and Literature Review of Professional Skepticism in Auditing
Nelson, M. W. (2009) · AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory · doi:10.2308/aud.2009.28.2.1 · Cited by 671
Conservatism and Auditor-Client Negotiations
Antle, R., & Nalebuff, B. (1991) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491002 · Cited by 464
Self-citationThe Reliability of Certification: Quality Labels as a Consumer Policy Tool
Jahn, G., Schramm, M., & Spiller, A. (2005) · Journal of Consumer Policy · doi:10.1007/s10603-004-7298-6 · Cited by 431
CONCEALMENT OF NEGATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL OUTCOMES: AN AGENCY THEORY PERSPECTIVE.
ABRAHAMSON, E., & PARK, C. (1994) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256674 · Cited by 408
Zaheer, S., & Zaheer, A. (2006) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400180 · Cited by 347
Regulatory Oversight of Financial Reporting: Securities and Exchange Commission Comment Letters
Johnston, R., & Petacchi, R. (2017) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1911-3846.12297 · Cited by 274
Trust across borders: buyer-supplier trust in global business-to-business E-commerce.
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Koh, T., Fichman, M., Carnegie Mellon University, Kraut, R., & Carnegie Mellon University (2012) · Journal of the Association for Information Systems · doi:10.17705/1jais.00316 · Cited by 73
Metadata
- Authors
- Antle, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting Research
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1982
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 503
- ISSN
- 0021-8456 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2314866834
- Cited by
- 292
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 20.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.