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Cited by 321

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard

Lambert, Richard A.·1983·The Bell Journal of Economics
DOI 10.2307/3003645
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Abstract

This article extends the economic theory of agency to a simple class of multiperiod situations. In this context we study the role of long-term contracts in controlling moral hazard problems. We characterize the optimal long-term contract, and show that even when the "environment" is separable over time, the agent's compensation in one period will depend on his performance in that period and his performance in the prior periods.

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Metadata

Authors
Lambert, R. A.
Venue
The Bell Journal of Economics
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1983
Volume
14
Issue
2
Pages
441
ISSN
0361-915X (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.2307/3003645
OpenAlex
W1491272445
Cited by
321
References
12
FWCI
8.86
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/3003645
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Lambert, R. A. (1983). Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard. The Bell Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003645

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.