The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
CONCEALMENT OF NEGATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL OUTCOMES: AN AGENCY THEORY PERSPECTIVE.
Abstract
To explore if, when, and how intentionally corporate officers conceal negative organizational outcomes from shareholders, we used computer-assisted content analysis of over 1,000 president's letters contained in annual reports to shareholders. Results suggest that outside directors, large institutional investors, and accountants limit such concealment, but small institutional investors and outside directors who are shareholders prompt it. Low disclosure is associated with subsequent selling of stock by top officers and outside directors. This result supports the claim that concealment by officers and its toleration by outside directors may be intentional.
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Citations
Cites
Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1989.4279003 · Cited by 13,338
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Power in Top Management Teams: Dimensions, Measurement, and Validation
Finkelstein, S. (1992) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/256485 · Cited by 2,389
The Double-Edge of Organizational Legitimation
Ashforth, B. E., & Gibbs, B. W. (1990) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1.2.177 · Cited by 2,228
Cited by
Scrutiny, Norms, and Selective Disclosure: A Global Study of Greenwashing
Marquis, C., Toffel, M. W., & Zhou, Y. (2016) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2015.1039 · Cited by 1,680
Risk reporting: A study of risk disclosures in the annual reports of UK companies
Linsley, P. M., & Shrives, P. J. (2006) · The British Accounting Review · doi:10.1016/j.bar.2006.05.002 · Cited by 776
Eggers, J. P., & Kaplan, S. (2009) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1080.0401 · Cited by 774
Short, J. C., Broberg, J. C., Cogliser, C. C., & Brigham, K. H. (2010) · Organizational Research Methods · doi:10.1177/1094428109335949 · Cited by 644
Heneman, R. L., Tansky, J. W., & Camp, S. M. (2000) · Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice · doi:10.1177/104225870002500103 · Cited by 429
Metadata
- Authors
- ABRAHAMSON, E., & PARK, C.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 1994-10-01
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1302-1334
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W2321060717
- Cited by
- 408
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 35.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: CONCEALMENT OF NEGATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL OUTCOMES: AN AGENCY THEORY PERSPECTIVE. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/256674
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- ABRAHAMSON, E., & PARK, C. (1994). CONCEALMENT OF NEGATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL OUTCOMES: AN AGENCY THEORY PERSPECTIVE. Academy of Management Journal. https://doi.org/10.2307/256674
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
