The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance
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Citations
Cites
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
Bureaucracy and Representative Government
Niskanen, W. A. (1971) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 5,203
Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis
Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2 · Cited by 4,970
Strategic information transmission
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913390 · Cited by 4,293
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
The Optimum Enforcement of Laws
Stigler, G. J. (1970) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259646 · Cited by 1,147
Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912637 · Cited by 1,037
Srinivasan, T. N. (1973) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(73)90024-8 · Cited by 479
Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework
Reinganum, J. F., & Wilde, L. L. (1985) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(85)90035-0 · Cited by 446
Self-citationThe Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement
Graetz, M. J., Reinganum, J. F., & Wilde, L. L. (1986) · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036900 · Cited by 395
Self-citationRegulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing
Baron, D. P., & Besanko, D. (1984) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555518 · Cited by 379
A Sequential Signalling Model of Convertible Debt Call Policy
HARRIS, M., & RAVIV, A. (1985) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02382.x · Cited by 194
Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand
Matthews, S. A., & Mirman, L. J. (1983) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912047 · Cited by 184
Incentive generating state dependent penalty system
Landsberger, M., & Meilijson, I. (1982) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(82)90060-3 · Cited by 136
An Optimal Conviction Policy for Offenses that May Have Been Committed by Accident
Rubinstein, A. (1979) · Physica-Verlag eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-41501-6_26 · Cited by 104
Environmental Pollution: Modeling Occurrence, Detection, and Deterrence
Epple, D. N., & Visscher, M. (1984) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467057 · Cited by 80
Cited by
Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration
Slemrod, J., & Yitzhaki, S. (2000) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7473 · Cited by 843
Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence
Frey, B. S., & Jegen, R. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.203330 · Cited by 643
Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence
Knowles, J., Persico, N., & Todd, P. (2001) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/318603 · Cited by 608
An Econometric Analysis of Income Tax Evasion and Its Detection
Feinstein, J. S. (1991) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2601005 · Cited by 470
WHAT MOTIVATES TAX COMPLIANCE?
Alm, J. (2019) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/joes.12272 · Cited by 442
Metadata
- Authors
- Reinganum, J. F., & Wilde, L. L.
- Venue
- International Economic Review
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1986-10
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 739
- ISSN
- 0020-6598 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2024294877
- Cited by
- 277
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 18.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.