Consciousness as Integrated Information: a Provisional Manifesto
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The integrated information theory (IIT) starts from phenomenology and makes use of thought experiments to claim that consciousness is integrated information. Specifically: (i) the quantity of consciousness corresponds to the amount of integrated information generated by a complex of elements; (ii) the quality of experience is specified by the set of informational relationships generated within that complex. Integrated information (Phi) is defined as the amount of information generated by a complex of elements, above and beyond the information generated by its parts. Qualia space (Q) is a space where each axis represents a possible state of the complex, each point is a probability distribution of its states, and arrows between points represent the informational relationships among its elements generated by causal mechanisms (connections). Together, the set of informational relationships within a complex constitute a shape in Q that completely and univocally specifies a particular experience. Several observations concerning the neural substrate of consciousness fall naturally into place within the IIT framework. Among them are the association of consciousness with certain neural systems rather than with others; the fact that neural processes underlying consciousness can influence or be influenced by neural processes that remain unconscious; the reduction of consciousness during dreamless sleep and generalized seizures; and the distinct role of different cortical architectures i…
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In the citing paper
“In many such cases, while subjects appear awake (eyes open), consciousness is most likely absent140.”
From Consciousness and sleep (2024) · cites this paper as [140]
In the citing paper
“PCI has been validated in many experimental and clinical conditions140 and is currently the most sensitive and specific measure to detect covert consciousness in clinical settings141.”
From Consciousness and sleep (2024) · cites this paper as [140]
In the citing paper
“IIT defines a property of a system called integrated information (Φ) and postulates that this is an exact measure of the quantity of consciousness of any system.”
From The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory (2015) · cites this paper as [3]
In the citing paper
“In general, IIT posits that software-based AI systems cannot achieve consciousness, as they lack the intrinsic cause-effect power required to integrate information effectively (Tononi, 2008; Tononi and Koch, 2015; Tononi et al., 2016; Koch, 2019).”
In the citing paper
“The integrated information theory (Tononi, 2008) suffers a similar problem. In that theory, consciousness is the result of highly integrated information in the brain.”
From The Attention Schema Theory: A Foundation for Engineering Artificial Consciousness (2017) · cites this paper as Tononi, 2008
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Citations
Cites
Mapping the structural core of human cerebral cortex
Hagmann, P., Cammoun, L., Gigandet, X., Meuli, R., Honey, C. J., Wedeen, V. J., & Sporns, O. (2008) · PLoS Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0060159 · Cited by 4,173
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The Human Connectome: A Structural Description of the Human Brain
Sporns, O., Tononi, G., & Kötter, R. (2005) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.0010042 · Cited by 3,260 · cited 1×
“Take the brain at the synaptic level, and disentangle its connectional organization in all its complexity: if one could visualize the intricacy of the “connectome” (Sporns et al., 2005) in a space of appropriate dimensionality, it would make for a remarkable shape indeed.”
BackgroundSelf-citation(1987) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 2,512
An information integration theory of consciousness
Tononi, G. (2004) · BMC Neuroscience · doi:10.1186/1471-2202-5-42 · Cited by 1,958 · cited 21×
“This state of affairs is not unlike the one faced by biologists when, knowing a great deal about similarities and differences between species, fossil remains, and breeding practices, they still lacked a theory of how evolution might occur.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialSelf-citationPashler, H. (1997) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5677.001.0001 · Cited by 1,607
Tononi, G. (1998) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.282.5395.1846 · Cited by 1,561 · cited 3×
“…particular group of neurons is excluded from the main complex because of hard-wired anatomical constraints or is transiently disconnected due to functional changes, the set of elements underlying consciousness is not static, but form a “dynamic complex” or “dynamic core” (Tononi and Edelman, 1998).”
BackgroundSelf-citationBreakdown of cortical effective connectivity during sleep
Massimini, M., Ferrarelli, F., Huber, R., Esser, S. K., Singh, H., & Tononi, G. (2005) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1117256 · Cited by 1,534
Self-citationCrick, F., & Koch, C. (2003) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn0203-119 · Cited by 1,492 · cited 1×
“The evidence suggests that the “neural correlate” (Crick and Koch, 2003) of color, including red, is probably a set of neurons and connections in the fusiform gyrus, maybe in area V8 (ideally, neurons in this area are activated whenever a subject sees red and not otherwise, if stimulated trigger…”
Background
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Cited by
Items 1,001–1,007 of 1,007
Parsing meaning and value in relation to experience
Taves, A. (2013) · Religion Brain & Behavior · doi:10.1080/2153599x.2013.816344 · Cited by 2
INFORMATIONAL MINDS: FROM ARISTOTLE TO LAPTOPS (BOOK EXTRACT)
Aleksander, I., & Morton, H. (2011) · International Journal of Machine Consciousness · doi:10.1142/s1793843011000844 · Cited by 2
Why does time feel the way it does? Towards a principled account of temporal experience
Comolatti, R., Grasso, M., & Tononi, G. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2412.13198 · Cited by 1
Self-citationIntegrated Information Theory (IIT) and Artificial Consciousness
Fallon, F. (2017) · Advances in Computational Intelligence and Robotics · doi:10.4018/978-1-5225-1947-8.ch001
Why large language models cannot possess consciousness: an integrated information theory perspective
Shin, D. A., Cho, P. G., Ji, G. Y., Park, S. H., Kim, S. H., Choo, Y. J., & Chang, M. C. (2025) · Journal of Yeungnam Medical Science · doi:10.12701/jyms.2025.42.79
“IIT provides a formal framework for understanding consciousness in terms of the causal structure of a system [5,6,8].”
The Ergonomics of Learning: A Proposed Update to Bloom’s Taxonomy
Curtis, A., & Johansson, A. (2025) · Intersection: A Journal at the Intersection of Assessment and Learning · doi:10.61669/001c.142595
Reina, S. (2026) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-026-01120-4
“Persistent and organized self-referential structure invites com - parison with Integrated Information Theory’s concern with unified yet differentiated informational organization [ 18].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Tononi, G.
- Affiliations
- University of Wisconsin–Madison (US)
- Corresponding author
- Tononi, Giulio
- ORCID
- Tononi, Giulio
- Venue
- The Biological Bulletin
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2008-12
- Volume
- 215
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 216-242
- ISSN
- 0006-3185 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-8697
- OpenAlex
- W2158935941
- Semantic Scholar
- 978cd2d493668348774552f55fed5a534ca8d6dd
- Cited by
- 1,529
- References
- 37
- Citations by year
- 2026: 118 · 2025: 127 · 2024: 141 · 2023: 121 · 2022: 80 · 2021: 92 · 2020: 79 · 2019: 120 · 2018: 87 · 2017: 107 · 2016: 72 · 2015: 74 · 2014: 87 · 2013: 65 · 2012: 66
- FWCI
- 41.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Biological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- integrated information theory, consciousness, qualia, dreamless sleep, generalized seizures, cortical architecture, phenomenology, thought experiments
- MeSH terms
- Consciousness, Humans, Information Theory, Models, Neurological, Neurobiology
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