The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding
Abstract
This article develops a model of the takeover bidding process. The model can be described as a form of auction in which a bidder can acquire costly information after the bidding has begun. Implications concerning the interrelationships between bidders' and targets' profits, bidders' initial offers, single and multiple bidder contests, and the effects of takeover legislation are developed. Additionally, the model provides a rationale for bidders to make high premium ("preemptive") initial bids, rather than making low initial bids and raising them if there is competition.
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Citations
Cites
The market for corporate control
Jensen, M. C., & Ruback, R. S. (1983) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(83)90004-1 · Cited by 4,141
On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets
Stiglitz, J. E., & Grossman, S. J. (1980) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8765r99 · Cited by 3,645
Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1980) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003400 · Cited by 3,098
Information aggregation in a noisy rational expectations economy
Diamond, D. W., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1981) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(81)90026-x · Cited by 1,067
Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912637 · Cited by 1,037
Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912511 · Cited by 500
Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control
Bradley, M. (1980) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296114 · Cited by 427
Perfect sequential equilibrium
Grossman, S. J., & Perry, M. (1986) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90022-0 · Cited by 379
Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance
Walkling, R. A., & Long, M. S. (1984) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003669 · Cited by 325
The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers
Jarrell, G. A., & Bradley, M. (1980) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466965 · Cited by 297
Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders' Interest
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555712 · Cited by 159
Tender Offers and Management Resistance
Baron, D. P. (1983) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02237.x · Cited by 112
Cited by
Bradley, M., Desai, A., & Kim, E. H. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90030-x · Cited by 1,701
Corporate Governance and Control
Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Röell, A. (2003) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/s1574-0102(03)01005-7 · Cited by 795
A Theory for the Choice of Exchange Medium in Mergers and Acquisitions
Hansen, R. G. (1987) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296386 · Cited by 740
Toeholds, Bid Jumps, and Expected Payoffs in Takeovers
Betton, S., & Eckbo, B. E. (2000) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/13.4.841 · Cited by 394
One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control
Grossman, S., & Hart, O. (1987) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w2347 · Cited by 334
Metadata
- Authors
- Fishman, M. J.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1988
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 88
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2078305501
- Cited by
- 367
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 10.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.