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Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders' Interest
Abstract
This article develops a model in which greenmail and other forms of management resistance to takeovers can benefit shareholders. In particular, discouraging some potential acquirers may increase shareholder wealth because it encourages others to pursue a combination with the target. This occurs because the number of competing acquirers is reduced and because resistance can signal that the target does not have access to a "white knight." This signalling effect may explain why share prices decline after management resists a takeover, even when such resistance is value-maximizing in the long run.
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Citations
Cited by
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Self-citationCorporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P. A., Ishii, J. L., & Metrick, A. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.278920 · Cited by 703
Metadata
- Authors
- Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1986
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 293
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1981152081
- Cited by
- 159
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 23.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders' Interest. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2555712
- The paper
- Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986). Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders' Interest. The RAND Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555712
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.