The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale
Abstract
This article analyzes incentives to acquire information about the value of things before sales transactions, and voluntary versus required disclosure of such information. Two distinctions are emphasized: whether information is mere foreknowledge or instead can raise value -- has social value; and whether it is sellers or buyers who decide to acquire information. The main conclusions in the model are that voluntary disclosure results in socially excessive incentives to acquire information; mandatory disclosure is socially desirable for sellers; but for buyers, the freedom to keep silent may be needed to spur acquisition of socially desirable information.
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Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003562 · Cited by 3,123
The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity
HIRSHLEIFER, J. (1978) · Uncertainty in Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-214850-7.50038-3 · Cited by 1,571
Truthful Disclosure of Information
Jovanovic, B. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003428 · Cited by 521
Strategic Information Revelation
Okuno-Fujiwara, M., Postlewaite, A., & Suzumura, K. (1990) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297541 · Cited by 338
Fulfilled Expectations Cournot Duopoly with Information Acquisition and Release
Novshek, W., & Sonnenschein, H. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003442 · Cited by 307
Quality Testing and Disclosure
Matthews, S., & Postlewaite, A. (1985) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555561 · Cited by 238
Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts
Kronman, A. T. (1978) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/467583 · Cited by 196
Sharing of Information Prior to Settlement or Litigation
Shavell, S. (1989) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555688 · Cited by 169
Self-citationGrieson, R. E. (1986) · Lexington Books · Cited by 71
Cited by
Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice
Dranove, D., & Jin, G. Z. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.4.935 · Cited by 740
Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation and Externalities
Admati, A. R., & Pfleiderer, P. (2000) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/13.3.479 · Cited by 515
Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation
Skreta, V., & Veldkamp, L. (2009) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2009.04.006 · Cited by 460
Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers
Fishman, M. J. (2003) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/19.1.45 · Cited by 292
Metadata
- Authors
- Shavell, S.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1994
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 20
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2069577472
- Cited by
- 316
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 2.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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