The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 51 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Is there Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using Takeover Legislation
Open accessAbstract
October, 1998
Overview
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Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“It is worth noting that studies identifying some effects of antitakeover statutes on firms largely focused on data from an earlier period during most of which such statutes did plausibly matter because incumbents did not yet have the power to maintain poison pills indefinitely”
From What Matters in Corporate Governance? (2009) · cites this paper as Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999)
Citations
Cites
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1999) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.99580 · Cited by 24,215
Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1980) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003400 · Cited by 3,098
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control
Manne, H. G. (1965) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259000 · Cited by 2,364
EFFICIENCY WAGES AND THE INTER-INDUSTRY WAGE STRUCTURE
Krueger, A., & Summers, L. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911072 · Cited by 1,856
Brown, C. C., & Medoff, J. (1989) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261642 · Cited by 1,535
The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme
Hart, O. (1983) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003639 · Cited by 1,472
Takeovers: Their Causes and ConsequencesPreprint
Jensen, M. C. (1988) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.173455 · Cited by 1,280
The Economic Structure of Corporate Law
Zacharias, L., Easterbrook, F., & Fischel, D. (1993) · doi:10.2307/3117372 · Cited by 1,245
The economics of discretionary behavior : managerial objectives in a theory of the firm
Williamson, O. (1965) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1910367 · Cited by 1,196
Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous Policies
Besley, T. J., & Case, A. C. (2000) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00578 · Cited by 671
Flagged first, then by citations
12 of the 51 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 201–214 of 214
Li, Z., & An, J.-Y. (2025) · Applied Economics · doi:10.1080/00036846.2025.2597477
Agency costs of stakeholderism: Evidence from compensation contracting at AT&T
Bryan, S., Nash, R. C., & Patel, A. (2025) · Journal of Applied Corporate Finance · doi:10.1111/jacf.12670
Hu, Z., Zheng, M., & You, B. (2023) · 经济学报. · doi:10.26599/cje.2023.9300404
Appointment-Based CEO Connectedness and Employee Compensation: Empirical Evidence from China
He, L., Rao, Y.-L., & Xu, L. (2023) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su151712785
“Managerial discretion is found to positively correlate to workers’ pay because of managers’ preference to pursue non-pecuniary private benefits such as pursuing a “quiet life” and lowering wage bargaining efforts [31,32].”
BackgroundManagerial discretion and efficiency of internal capital markets
Iskenderoglu, C. (2021) · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102061
Top Management Team attributes and the probability of firm default
Bhaiyat, F. H. (2019) · Sheffield Hallam University · doi:10.7190/shu-thesis-00216
“This view was supported by Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999, 2003) who found that there was little evidence of an increase in firm size after the introduction of antitakeover legislation, i.e. empire building, however, they found patterns of investment and divestment that are suggestive of the quiet…”
BackgroundResearch on the Incentives to Top Management Base on Data Mining Technology
Zhao, B., & Li, Y.-Z. (2010) · 2010 International Conference on Management and Service Science · doi:10.1109/icmss.2010.5576792
Employee Compensation in Venture-Backed Firms
Bengtsson, O., & Hand, J. R. M. (2010) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1673612
“For example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999, 2003) show that employee pay in U.S. public companies increases after the CEO becomes more powerful following more aggressive anti-takeover legislation. However, whereas Cronqvist et al. (2008) find that employee compensation is higher in Swedish public firms with powerful…”
Are Entrenched Managers Less Likely to Pay Dividends? A Test Using Antitakeover Legislation
Francis, B. B., Hasan, I., John, K., & Song, L. (2009) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1361834
Cordeiro, F. F. (2026) · Revista Contabilidade & Finanças · doi:10.1590/1808-057x2026100-3.pt
The financial market and company/stakeholder integration: past and future
Cordeiro, F. F. (2026) · Revista Contabilidade & Finanças · doi:10.1590/1808-057x2026100-3.en
CEO Pay Disclosure and Within-Firm Wage Inequality
Maida, A., & Pezone, V. (2024) · Social Science Research Network · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4939155
“Higher CEO pay can be a reward for the skills required to manage large and complex organizations (Gabaix and Landier, 2008) but could also be the result of poor governance (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 1999).”
The effect of corporate takeover on the function of internal incentive plan in target firms
Li, L., Cheng, P., & Tong, W. H. (2012) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1880891
Insider Entrenchment and CEO Compensation in Entrepreneurial Firms: An Empirical Investigation
Forst, A. (2009) · doi:10.25772/7yrk-1s72
“Results may therefore be equally consistent with an unobserved, firm-specific variable driving both governance and compensation (Core et al. 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 1999).”
Result
Metadata
- Authors
- Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S.
- Affiliations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1999
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 535
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2123968322
- Cited by
- 221
- References
- 51
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 12 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 12 · 2012: 13
- FWCI
- 6.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- Locations
- The RAND Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Labor market dynamics and wage inequality
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Industrial relations › Labor Movements and Unions
- Keywords
- wage determination, takeover law, corporate acquisition, labor market regulation
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