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Is there Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using Takeover Legislation
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October, 1998
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“It is worth noting that studies identifying some effects of antitakeover statutes on firms largely focused on data from an earlier period during most of which such statutes did plausibly matter because incumbents did not yet have the power to maintain poison pills indefinitely”
From What Matters in Corporate Governance? (2009) · cites this paper as Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999)
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Cites
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“Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), we address this issue by replacing the BC dummy in equation (2) with four dummies: BC Y ear(−1), BC Y ear(0), BC Y ear(1), and BC Y ear(2+), where BC Y ear(−1) is a dummy that equals one if the firm is incorporated in a state that will pass a BC law in one year from now, BC…”
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“Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999),e.g.provide evidence that managers have apreference for paying high wages.”
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“For instance, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) randomly sampled 200 firms from their data set and manually checked how many of them had changed their state of incorporation; only three changes were found—all to Delaware and all several years prior to passage of their respective states’ BC laws.”
Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensationPreprint
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“Consistent with this, Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999a) show that bigger firms increase wages more in response to the takeover protection afforded by the second generation anti-takeovers laws.”
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“(3) ̄R > [(1 + ¿)=¿ ] 2 ̄: this inequality ensures the contestability of control over the company.”
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“Thus, there is compelling evidence that external takeover threats play a major role in executive compensation design, and this may help explain recent empirical findings by Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999), that compensation levels increase following the passage of antitakeover legislation.”
BackgroundCorporate Governance: Effects on Firm Performance and Economic Growth
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“More recently, Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999) examined the effects of state anti-takeover legislation, in particular, business combination (BC) legislation”
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“Our paper is most closely related to the recent work by Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999, 2003), who show that there was a significantly larger increase in the wage bill for firms incorporated in states that passed antitakeover laws in the U.S. in the 1980s than for a control group.3 Our evidence…”
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“…antitakeover laws led to a reduction in the equity ownership of officers and directors (Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan, 2004), changes in managerial pay (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 1999, 2000; Cheng and Indjejikian, 2009), a reduction in firm leverage (Garvey and Hanka, 1999), a decline in firm…”
BackgroundResultInfluentialCan corporate social responsibility protect firm value during the COVID-19 pandemic?
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“Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999) use variation in the timing and adoption of business combination (BC) laws by states to proxy for corporate governance quality of firms incorporated in each state.”
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“To test our hypotheses, we use the differences-in-differences method following Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999a, 1999b, 2003) and Low (2009).”
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“Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999a, 1999b, 2000) find similar results.”
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“…used to discipline managers (Schneper & Guillen, 2004), studies have revealed that when freed from takeover pressures, executives extract higher pay for their workers (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 1999, 2003) and pursue stakeholder-friendly practices such as community development (Kacperczyk, 2009).”
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“, Bertrand and Mullainathan 1999, 2003) and, thus, CEO protection becomes less important. Garmaise (2011) finds that in states where non-competition agreements are better enforced, executive stability increases.”
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“See, for instance, Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999, 2003) and Low (2009).”
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“For example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999, 2003) find that strong antitakeover provisions lead to higher wages because of less threat that management will be removed by shareholders.”
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“Prior research has used various alternate measures, such as average wages per employee (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 1999), total number of employees (Brown & Medhoff, 1988), and total wages as a ratio of firm sales (Scheps, 1981).”
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“Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999) BCL 9305 firm-years (1976-1995) for 877 firms Average wage Wages increase more in firms that are incorporated in the states passing BCL Antitakeover laws increased managerial discretion in wage setting.”
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“24 This set of robustness checks is similar to that undertaken by Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999).”
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“[12] Bertrand, Marianne and Sendhil Mullainathan.”
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InfluentialContractual Corporate Governance
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“4For empirical evidence consistent with this view, see Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999, 2003).”
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“However, in sharp contrast to Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999, 2003) and Cronqvist et al. (2008) who show that workers are paid more when investors are less powerful, consistent with CEOs of mature firms having a taste for the “quiet life” that comes with less aggressive bargaining with workers, we…”
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“In particular, we rely on prior studies by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999), and Masulis et al. (2009) to guide our choice of control variables in the panel regression.”
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“Consistent with the increase in managerial discretion after the passage of antitakeover laws, Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999) report that managerial compensation increased by 1–2 percent in affected firms. In a follow-up paper, Bertrand andMullainathan (2003) find that when managers are insulated from takeover pressu…”
InfluentialGovernance and firm value: The effect of a recession
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Brown, K., Jha, R., & Pacharn, P. (2015) · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.04.027 · Cited by 27
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González-Uribe, J., & Groen-Xu, M. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2633763 · Cited by 26
The Wealth Effects of Reducing Private Placement Resale Restrictions
Maynes, E., & Pandes, A. (2011) · European Financial Management · doi:10.1111/j.1468-036x.2010.00564.x · Cited by 26
“16 See Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999) for a practical illustration of the differences-in-differences methodology.”
Do Executive Compensation Contracts Maximize Firm Value? Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment
Abudy, M., Amiram, D., Rozenbaum, O., & Shust, E. (2017) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2993052 · Cited by 25
“, Bertrand and Mullainathan 1999, 2000, 2001). Thus, contracts are not chosen by boards to maximize shareholder value but instead by the executives themselves to maximize their rents. This perspective is espoused most prominently by Bebchuk and Fried (2004). Similar views on executive rent extraction in closely contro…”
BackgroundEx Ante Severance Agreements and Earnings Management
Brown, K. (2015) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1911-3846.12103 · Cited by 25
Metadata
- Authors
- Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S.
- Affiliations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1999
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 535
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2123968322
- Cited by
- 221
- References
- 51
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 12 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 12 · 2012: 13
- FWCI
- 6.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- Locations
- The RAND Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Labor market dynamics and wage inequality
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Industrial relations › Labor Movements and Unions
- Keywords
- wage determination, takeover law, corporate acquisition, labor market regulation
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