The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 51 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Is there Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using Takeover Legislation
Open accessAbstract
October, 1998
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“It is worth noting that studies identifying some effects of antitakeover statutes on firms largely focused on data from an earlier period during most of which such statutes did plausibly matter because incumbents did not yet have the power to maintain poison pills indefinitely”
From What Matters in Corporate Governance? (2009) · cites this paper as Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999)
Citations
Cites
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Takeovers: Their Causes and ConsequencesPreprint
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The Economic Structure of Corporate Law
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Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences
Auerbach, A. (1988) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226032160.001.0001 · Cited by 453
Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage
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Ownership, Agency, and Wages: An Examination of Franchising in the Fast Food Industry
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The wealth effects of second-generation state takeover legislation
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Pay Differentials by Size of Establishment
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The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on Labor
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State intervention in the market for corporate control : The case of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310
Szewczyk, S. H., & Tsetsekos, G. P. (1992) · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(92)90009-m · Cited by 114
Do union wealth concessions explain takeover premiums? : The evidence on contract wages
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Do hostile takeovers reduce extramarginal wage payments
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Schumann, L. (1988) · doi:10.2307/2555457 · Cited by 59
Executive Compensation and Incentives: The Impact of Takeover Legislation
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (1998) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w6830 · Cited by 54
Self-citationAn Analysis of the Stock Price Effect of the 1986 Ohio Takeover Legislation
Margotta, D. G., McWilliams, T., & McWilliams, V. B. (1990) · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036988 · Cited by 35
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Reincorporation: Motives and Shareholder Wealth
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Imports and Domestic Wages: Is the Relationship Consistent with Expense Preference Behavior?
Heywood, J. (1991) · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a037015 · Cited by 14
Internal and External Labor Markets: An Analysis of Matched Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2003) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/376950 · Cited by 3,777
Self-citationWhat Matters in Corporate Governance?
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn099 · Cited by 2,906
Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, L., & Fried, J. M. (2004) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.42-4735 · Cited by 1,870
Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Equity PricesPreprint
Giroud, X., & Mueller, H. M. (2008) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1247715 · Cited by 1,180
Metadata
- Authors
- Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S.
- Affiliations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1999
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 535
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2123968322
- Cited by
- 221
- References
- 51
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 8 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 12 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 12 · 2012: 13
- FWCI
- 6.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- Locations
- The RAND Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Labor market dynamics and wage inequality
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Industrial relations › Labor Movements and Unions
- Keywords
- wage determination, takeover law, corporate acquisition, labor market regulation
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