The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior
Abstract
Egalement paru dans : INRA-ESR Toulouse Série D, 94-12D et 95-11D Diffusion du document : INRA Unité d'Economie et Sociologie rurales CRA Auzeville BP 27 31326 Castanet-Tolosan (FRA) ; (F3 380 (1) (2) (3) /C13 IDEI 44) 94-12D ; 95-11D
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Ysander, B.-C., & Arrow, K. J. (1975) · The Swedish Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3438925 · Cited by 2,600
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
Baron, D. P., & Myerson, R. B. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912769 · Cited by 1,721
Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations
(1986) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036907 · Cited by 1,214
The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture
Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J. (1991) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937958 · Cited by 1,155
Self-citationWilson, J. Q. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-9 · Cited by 1,084
Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies
Dewatripont, M., & Maskin, E. (1995) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2298076 · Cited by 1,078
The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective
Dixit, A. K. (1996) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4391.001.0001 · Cited by 1,036
The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions
Schwartz, L. B., & Kahn, A. E. (1972) · University of Pennsylvania Law Review · doi:10.2307/3311366 · Cited by 716
Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture
Gul, F., Sonnenschein, H., & Wilson, R. (1986) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90024-4 · Cited by 700
Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design
Milgrom, P. R. (1988) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261523 · Cited by 633
Cited by
Dal Bo, E. (2006) · Oxford Review of Economic Policy · doi:10.1093/oxrep/grj013 · Cited by 960
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828042002606 · Cited by 904
Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint
Qian, Y., & Roland, G. (1999) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.149988 · Cited by 546
Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking *
Agarwal, S., Lucca, D., Seru, A., & Trebbi, F. (2014) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qju003 · Cited by 479
Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation
Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. M. (2007) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03027-5 · Cited by 420
Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization
Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. M. (2006) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.44.2.325 · Cited by 390
After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Societies
Hoff, K., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828041464533 · Cited by 358
Corruption and inefficiency: Theory and evidence from electric utilities
Dal Bó, E., & Rossi, M. A. (2007) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.11.005 · Cited by 335
Incentives and Political Economy
Laffont, J.-J. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199248680.001.0001 · Cited by 299
Self-citationPolitical Economics and Public Finance
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1999) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w7097 · Cited by 279
Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability
Quintyn, M. (2003) · CESifo Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/cesifo/49.2.259 · Cited by 216
Metadata
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.