The DOI matches its Crossref record; 78 of the 78 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Strategic alliance structuring: a game theoretic and transaction cost examination of interfirm cooperation
Abstract
Maintaining robust cooperation in interfirm strategic alliances poses special problems. Such relationships have received growing attention in recent research grounded in game theory, which has suggested that some alliance structures are inherently more likely than others to be associated with high opportunity to cheat, high behavioral uncertainty, and poor stability, longevity, and performance. The present study merged these theoretical insights with the logic of transaction cost economics in a general model of alliance structuring and tested it with data from 111 interfirm alliances. Findings generally supported the model and hypotheses, suggesting the need for a greater focus on game theoretic structural dimensions and institutional responses to perceived opportunism in the study of voluntary interfirm cooperation.
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“Scale items were separated by not labelling variables in view of the reported constructs and not grouping items by variables, thus reducing the possibility of respondents guessing and consciously matching the link between variables (Parkhe, 1993).”
From Understanding managers’ attitudes and behavioral intentions towards using artificial intelligence for organizational decision-making (2021) · cites this paper as Parkhe, 1993
In the citing paper
“One of the insights of our review concerns the role of private goals versus common goals (Khanna et al., 1998;Parkhe, 1993).”
From Collaboration, Coordination, and Cooperation Among Organizations: Establishing the Distinctive Meanings of These Terms Through a Systematic Literature Review (2020) · cites this paper as Parkhe, 1993
In the citing paper
“In the literature on alliances, for instance, researchers distinguish between”
From Collaboration, Coordination, and Cooperation Among Organizations: Establishing the Distinctive Meanings of These Terms Through a Systematic Literature Review (2020) · cites this paper as Parkhe, 1993
In the citing paper
“Williamsonian opportunism represents a zero-sum game (e.g., Jarillo, 1988;Parkhe, 1993): one partner unduly extracts value from the other.”
From Collaboration, Coordination, and Cooperation Among Organizations: Establishing the Distinctive Meanings of These Terms Through a Systematic Literature Review (2020) · cites this paper as Parkhe, 1993
Citations
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Cited by
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J.-Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003) · Journal of Applied Psychology · doi:10.1037/0021-9010.88.5.879 · Cited by 82,194
The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and Sources of Interorganizational Competitive Advantage
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Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology
Powell, W. W., Koput, K. W., & Smith-Doerr, L. (1996) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393988 · Cited by 8,499
DOES FAMILIARITY BREED TRUST? THE IMPLICATIONS OF REPEATED TIES FOR CONTRACTUAL CHOICE IN ALLIANCES.
Gulati, R. (1995) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/256729 · Cited by 4,991
Gulati, R. (1998) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199804)19:4<293::aid-smj982>3.0.co;2-m · Cited by 4,668
Metadata
- Authors
- Parkhe, A.
- Affiliations
- Indiana University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Parkhe, A.
- ORCID
- Parkhe, A.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Journal
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 1993-08-01
- Volume
- 36
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 794-829
- ISSN
- 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
- 1948-0989
- OpenAlex
- W2021301441
- Cited by
- 2,698
- References
- 78
- Citations by year
- 2026: 23 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 45 · 2023: 53 · 2022: 57 · 2021: 55 · 2020: 83 · 2019: 97 · 2018: 117 · 2017: 104 · 2016: 104 · 2015: 121 · 2014: 136 · 2013: 169 · 2012: 120
- FWCI
- 62.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Academy of Management Journal (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Business Strategy and Innovation
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Management Information Systems › Outsourcing and Supply Chain Management
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Innovation and Knowledge Management
- Keywords
- inter-firm cooperation, opportunism, cheating, behavioral uncertainty, alliance stability, alliance performance, transaction cost economics, game theory, institutional responses
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.