The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests
Abstract
Political decisions are often biased in favor of special interests at the expense of the general public, and they are frequently inefficient in the sense that the losses incurred by the majority exceed the gains enjoyed by the minority. This article explains the bias in terms of information asymmetries and the free-rider problem. First, incumbents increase their reelection prospects by biasing policy toward groups that are better able to monitor their activities. Second, because smaller groups are better able to overcome the free-rider problem of costly monitoring, policy will be biased in their favor. Third, the effect of asymmetric monitoring on voter welfare is ambiguous. The inefficiencies created by the policy bias are offset by a positively valued selection bias:Incumbents of above-average quality are more likely to survive voter scrutiny than are low-quality types.
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Citations
Cites
Coase, R. H. (1960) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466560 · Cited by 18,255
Olson, M. (1965) · doi:10.4159/9780674041660 · Cited by 14,191
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
McCubbins, M. D., & Schwartz, T. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110792 · Cited by 2,936
Cited by
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Ashworth, S. (2012) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-031710-103823 · Cited by 535
Information and American democracy: technology in the evolution of political power
(2003) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.41-1216 · Cited by 534
Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of Political Power
Bimber, B. (2003) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511615573 · Cited by 526
Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy
Strömberg, D. (2004) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/0034-6527.00284 · Cited by 464
Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism
Dai, X. (2005) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818305050125 · Cited by 392
Metadata
- Authors
- Lohmann, S.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1998-12
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 809-827
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W2323510620
- Cited by
- 233
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 8.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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