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Cited by 392

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism

Dai, Xinyuan·2005·International Organization

Abstract

Why do countries comply with international agreements? While scholars have done rigorous work to address compliance and enforcement in an international game, less analytical attention has been paid to domestic mechanisms of compliance. However, because international agreements have domestic distributional consequences, there exist domestic sources of enforcement. In this article, I develop an analytical framework of domestic accountability, where I identify specific channels of influence through which domestic constituencies can influence national compliance. Using a game theoretic model, I show that a government's compliance decision reflects the electoral leverage and the informational status of domestic constituencies. This framework further provides a theoretical rationale for why and how international institutions may influence states' compliance through domestic mechanisms. The European acid rain regime offers an empirical illustration of the domestic constituency argument.

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Show all 38 references

Research works printed but not linked: 26

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Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Dai, X.
Venue
International Organization
Published
2005-04
Volume
59
Issue
02
Pages
363-398
ISSN
  • 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-5088
OpenAlex
W2171858823
Cited by
392
References
38
FWCI
37.60
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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Dai, X. (2005). Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism. International Organization. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818305050125

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