The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Share Repurchase and Takeover Deterrence
Abstract
This article examines the use of share repurchase as a takeover deterrent. The main result is that in the presence of an upward-sloping supply curve for shares, the takeover cost to the acquirer can be greater if the target firm distributes cash through share repurchase than if it chooses either to pay a cash dividend or to do nothing. Because shareholders willing to tender in the repurchase are systematically those with the lowest valuations, the repurchase skews the distribution of remaining shareholders toward a more expensive pool. Examining the equilibrium behavior of all players in a stylized takeover game, conditions exist under which repurchase deters takeover. The example of capital gains taxation is then considered, when investors with different basis values impute different reservation values to their holding. Repurchase is more effective as a deterrent when it alters the marginal shareholder, when shareholder heterogeneity is large, and when the private benefit of control from takeover isn't too large.
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Citations
Cites
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1986) · Cited by 17,275
The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment
Miller, M. H. (1958) · American Economic Review · Cited by 14,574
Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1980) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003400 · Cited by 3,098
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Bradley, M., Desai, A., & Kim, E. H. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90030-x · Cited by 1,701
Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down?
SHLEIFER, A. (1986) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04518.x · Cited by 1,521
One-share-one-vote and the market for corporate control
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90044-x · Cited by 1,342
Common stock repurchases and market signalling
Vermaelen, T. (1981) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(81)90011-8 · Cited by 1,032
HARRIS, L., & GUREL, E. (1986) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04550.x · Cited by 1,023
Corporate control contests and capital structure
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90040-2 · Cited by 704
Cited by
Dividends, Share Repurchases, and the Substitution Hypothesis
Grullon, G., & Michaely, R. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00474 · Cited by 1,467
Why Do Firms Repurchase Stock?
Dittmar, A. K. (2000) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/209646 · Cited by 932
The Information Content of Share Repurchase Programs
Grullon, G., & Michaely, R. (2004) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00645.x · Cited by 823
COMMENT, R., & JARRELL, G. A. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04617.x · Cited by 616
Corporate payout policy and managerial stock incentives
Fenn, G. W., & Liang, N. (2001) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00039-3 · Cited by 559
Metadata
- Authors
- Bagwell, L. S.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1991
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 72
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2042812682
- Cited by
- 266
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 22.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.