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Cited by 726

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 39 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Sanctioning Systems, Decision Frames, and Cooperation

Tenbrunsel, Ann E., Messick, David M.·1999·Administrative Science Quarterly

Abstract

Three studies are used to examine how surveillance and sanctioning systems affect cooperative behavior in dilemma situations. The first two studies demonstrate that a weak sanctioning system results in less cooperation than no sanctioning system; furthermore, results from the second study suggest that sanctions affect the type of decision people perceive they are making, prompting them to see it as a business rather than an ethical decision. The results from these studies are used to develop a theoretical model that postulates that the relationship between sanctions and cooperation is due to both a signaling effect, in which sanctions influence the type of decision that is perceived to be made, and a processing effect, in which the decision processing, including whether or not the strength of the sanction is considered, depends on the decision frame evoked. A third study provides support for the processing-effect hypothesis.

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Metadata

Authors
Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Messick, D. M.
Venue
Administrative Science Quarterly
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1999-12
Volume
44
Issue
4
Pages
684-707
ISSN
  • 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
  • 1930-3815
OpenAlex
W2022480744
Cited by
726
References
39
FWCI
22.32
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Sanctioning Systems, Decision Frames, and Cooperation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2667052
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Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Messick, D. M. (1999). Sanctioning Systems, Decision Frames, and Cooperation. Administrative Science Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.2307/2667052

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.