The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review
Abstract
from 1983 to1995. ourts with the power to exercise constitutional review-as constitutional courts or in a decentralized system of judicial reviewconstitute central institutions of governance in most Western-style democracies. I present a simple game-theoretic model that provides a unified account of the multi-faceted interactions between such courts and the legislatures they are, at least in part, intended to control. The model addresses legislative anticipation of judicial review, legislative reactions to judicial rulings, and investigates the implications for judicial behavior. It demonstrates that the political environment in which a court must act is crucially important to the manner in which it will use its powers. As a result, the analysis provides important insights into the extent and the limits of judicial influence, thereby addressing questions that have been a recurring topic of debate among judicial scholars in the last decade (e.g., Holland 1991; Stone 1992; Tate and Vallinder 1995). In addition, the model lends insight into the current debate concerning the extent of strategic behavior by justices, demonstrating under which circumstances justices are likely to be constrained by strategic considerations and when this will not be the case (e.g., Carrubba 2000; Ferejohn and Weingast 1992; Rogers 2001; Segal 1997). The article is organized as follows. The next section introduces the substantive feature of legislative-judicial relations that is central to the analysis. The third section describes the model. In the fourth section, I present the equilibria of the game and interpret the results. The fifth section provides an empirical test of some of the model's conclusions using data on the decisions of the German Constitutional Court. The final section concludes.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
(2020) · Foundations of Modern Econometrics · doi:10.1142/9789811220197_0001 · Cited by 3,457
Congress: The Electoral Connection, by David R. Mayhew
Page, B. I. (1975) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2148248 · Cited by 3,130
The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law
Weingast, B. R. (1997) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2952354 · Cited by 1,750
Game Theory for Applied Economists
Gibbons, R. S. (1992) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400835881 · Cited by 1,466
The Global expansion of judicial power
(1996) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.33-3542 · Cited by 1,063
The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring about Social Change?
Scheppele, K. L., & Rosenberg, G. N. (1992) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2075854 · Cited by 1,009
Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe
Sweet, A. S. (2000) · doi:10.1093/0198297718.001.0001 · Cited by 855
The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective
Epp, C. R. (1998) · Cited by 796
On the Legitimacy of National High Courts
Gibson, J. L., Caldeira, G. A., & Baird, V. A. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585668 · Cited by 686
Sweet, A. S., & Brunell, T. L. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585929 · Cited by 484
Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court
Caldeira, G. A., & Wright, J. R. (1988) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961752 · Cited by 439
Kommers, D. P., & Miller, R. A. (2012) · Duke University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv125jqj0 · Cited by 350
A positive theory of statutory interpretation
Ferejohn, J., & Weingast, B. R. (1992) · International Review of Law and Economics · doi:10.1016/0144-8188(92)90046-t · Cited by 304
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association
Hayden, J. R. (1929) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1945597 · Cited by 280
Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative-Judicial Interaction
Rogers, J. R. (2001) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669361 · Cited by 257
Spriggs, J. F. (1996) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111745 · Cited by 133
Vanberg, G. (2000) · Comparative Politics · doi:10.2307/422370 · Cited by 88
Self-citation
Cited by
The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany
Vanberg, G. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510427 · Cited by 528
Self-citationCourts under constraints: judges, generals, and presidents in Argentina
(2005) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.43-0578 · Cited by 323
WHITTINGTON, K. E. (2005) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055405051890 · Cited by 285
Regimes and the Rule of Law: Judicial Independence in Comparative Perspective
Helmke, G., & Rosenbluth, F. (2009) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.040907.121521 · Cited by 283
Courts under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents in Argentina
Helmke, G. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510144 · Cited by 266
Metadata
- Authors
- Vanberg, G.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2001-04
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 346
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2322078381
- Cited by
- 364
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 187.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.