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Cited by 480

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Competitive Price Discrimination

Armstrong, Mark, Vickers, John·2001·The RAND Journal of Economics

Abstract

We model firms as supplying utility directly to consumers. The equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship π (u) between profit and average utility per consumer. Public policy constraints on the “deals” firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes via their effect on π(u) .F rom this perspective we examine the profit, utility, and welfare implications of price discrimination policies in an oligopolistic framework. We also show that an equilibrium outcome of competitive nonlinear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two-part tariffs.

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Metadata

Authors
Armstrong, M., & Vickers, J.
Venue
The RAND Journal of Economics
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2001
Volume
32
Issue
4
Pages
579
ISSN
0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1980095108
Cited by
480
References
19
FWCI
51.01
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Competitive Price Discrimination. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2696383
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Armstrong, M., & Vickers, J. (2001). Competitive Price Discrimination. The RAND Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2696383

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.