The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Competitive Price Discrimination
Abstract
We model firms as supplying utility directly to consumers. The equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship π (u) between profit and average utility per consumer. Public policy constraints on the “deals” firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes via their effect on π(u) .F rom this perspective we examine the profit, utility, and welfare implications of price discrimination policies in an oligopolistic framework. We also show that an equilibrium outcome of competitive nonlinear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two-part tariffs.
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Citations
Cites
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Salop, S. C. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003323 · Cited by 2,975
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Armstrong, M. (1996) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171924 · Cited by 510
Self-citationQuality Segmentation in Spatial Markets: When Does Cannibalization Affect Product Line Design?
Desai, P. S. (2001) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.20.3.265.9767 · Cited by 463
Equilibrium with Product Differentiation
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Cited by
Competition in two-sided markets
Armstrong, M. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00037.x · Cited by 3,315
Self-citationQuality Segmentation in Spatial Markets: When Does Cannibalization Affect Product Line Design?
Desai, P. S. (2001) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.20.3.265.9767 · Cited by 463
The Welfare Effects of Bundling in Multichannel Television Markets
Crawford, G. S., & Yurukoglu, A. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.2.643 · Cited by 448
Chapter 34 Price Discrimination and Competition
Stole, L. A. (2007) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03034-2 · Cited by 309
The Economics of Multidimensional Screening
Rochet, J.-C., & Stole, L. A. (2010) · Advances in Economics and Econometrics · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610240.006 · Cited by 289
Personalized Pricing and Quality Differentiation
Choudhary, V., Ghose, A., Mukhopadhyay, T., & Rajan, U. (2005) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1050.0383 · Cited by 278
The impact of competition on bank orientation
Degryse, H., & Ongena, S. (2007) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2007.03.002 · Cited by 272
Cellular Service Demand: Biased Beliefs, Learning, and Bill Shock
Grubb, M. D., & Osborne, M. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20120283 · Cited by 268
Overcoming Adverse Selection: How Public Intervention Can Restore Market Functioning
Tirole, J. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.1.29 · Cited by 263
Ellison, G. (2005) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/120.2.585 · Cited by 259
Big data and personalized price discrimination in EU competition law
Townley, C., Morrison, E., & Yeung, K. (2017) · Yearbook of European Law · doi:10.1093/yel/yex015 · Cited by 61
Metadata
- Authors
- Armstrong, M., & Vickers, J.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2001
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 579
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1980095108
- Cited by
- 480
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 51.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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