The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium
Abstract
Candidates for office are modeled as promising services, such as support for legislation and intervention in the bureaucracy, to interest groups in exchange for campaign contributions. An electoral equilibrium is characterized in which candidates choose service-contribution offers and interest groups choose whether to contribute. The model provides several explanations of congressional incumbents' success in over 90 percent of their reelection contests: a recognition advantage, a high personal valuation of the office, a lower cost of providing services, and policy alignment with high demand interest groups. The model yields predictions that are consistent with empirical findings on the relation between campaign contributions and election outcomes.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?
Ansolabehere, S., de Figueiredo, J. M., & Snyder, J. M. (2003) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533003321164976 · Cited by 1,281
Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1996) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297852 · Cited by 1,036
A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage
Groseclose, T. (2001) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2669329 · Cited by 754
Political connections and SEC enforcement
Correia, M. M. (2014) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.04.004 · Cited by 693
Mapping the Ideological Marketplace
Bonica, A. (2014) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12062 · Cited by 680
Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters
Baron, D. P. (1994) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2944880 · Cited by 641
Self-citationIs It Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process
Bertrand, M., Bombardini, M., & Trebbi, F. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.12.3885 · Cited by 483
Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism
Keefer, P., & Vlaicu, R. (2007) · Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/ewm054 · Cited by 457
Campaign Contributions and Access
Austen-Smith, D. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082974 · Cited by 450
Jayachandran, S. (2006) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/501091 · Cited by 316
The role of stock ownership by US members of Congress on the market for political favors
Tahoun, A. (2014) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.10.008 · Cited by 310
Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective
Milyo, J., Primo, D., & Groseclose, T. (2000) · Business and Politics · doi:10.2202/1469-3569.1004 · Cited by 302
Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy
GORDON, S. C., & HAFER, C. (2005) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055405051634 · Cited by 281
The disadvantaged incumbents: estimating incumbency effects in Indian state legislatures
Uppal, Y. (2009) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-008-9336-4 · Cited by 273
Bailout for sale? The vote to save Wall Street
Dorsch, M. (2013) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-011-9888-6 · Cited by 16
Metadata
- Authors
- Baron, D. P.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1989-02
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 45
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2080642065
- Cited by
- 224
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 43.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.