The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
Abstract
This paper proposes a characterization of optimal strategies for playing certain repeated coordination games whose players have identical preferences. Players' optimal coordination strategies reflect their uncertainty about how their partners will respond to multiple-equilibrium problems; this uncertainty constrains the statistical relationships between their strategy choices players can bring about. The authors show that optimality is nevertheless consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium. Examples are analyzed in which players use precedents as focal points to achieve and maintain coordination, and in which they play dominated strategies with positive probability in early stages in the hope of generating a useful precedent. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.
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Citations
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Self-citationLoss-Avoidance and Forward Induction in Experimental Coordination Games
Cachon, G. P., & Camerer, C. F. (1996) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946661 · Cited by 256
Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
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Metadata
- Authors
- Crawford, V. P., & Haller, H.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1990-05
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 571
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2064882565
- Cited by
- 377
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 12.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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