The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
Abstract
The authors study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition, macroeconomic coordination failures, arms races, bank runs, technology adoption and diffusion, R&D competition, pretrial bargaining, coordination in teams, and many others. For all these games, the sets of pure strategy Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds. Also, for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best-response dynamics and Bayesian learning, the players' choices lie eventually within the same bounds. These bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261729 · Cited by 5,364
Towards a theory of ecosystems
Jacobides, M. G., Cennamo, C., & Gawer, A. (2018) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2904 · Cited by 3,724
General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’?
Bresnahan, T. F., & Trajtenberg, M. (1995) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/0304-4076(94)01598-t · Cited by 2,879
Complementarities and fit strategy, structure, and organizational change in manufacturing
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1995) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(94)00382-f · Cited by 2,559
Self-citationGreif, A. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261959 · Cited by 2,384
Metadata
- Authors
- Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1990-11
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1255
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2130752181
- Cited by
- 1,804
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 13.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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