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The Evolution of Conventions

Young, H. Peyton · 1993 · Econometrica

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

The author shows how a group of individuals can learn to play a coordination game without any common knowledge and with only a small amount of rationality. The game is repeated many times by different players. Each player chooses an optimal reply based on incomplete information about what other players have done in the past. Occasionally they make mistakes. When the likelihood of mistakes is very small, typically one coordination equilibrium will be played almost all of the time over the long run. This stochastically stable equilibrium can be computed analytically using a general theorem the author proves on perturbed Markov processes. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.

Overview

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Registry

Crossref · 10.2307/2951778

Cites

20 of 20 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

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Metadata

Authors
Young, H. P.
Corresponding author
Young, H. Peyton
Venue
Econometrica
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
1993-01
Volume
61
Issue
1
Pages
57
ISSN
0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2118994458
Cited by
2,399
References
20
Citations by year
2026: 52 · 2025: 57 · 2024: 75 · 2023: 86 · 2022: 65 · 2021: 78 · 2020: 57 · 2019: 63 · 2018: 83 · 2017: 82 · 2016: 83 · 2015: 83 · 2014: 114 · 2013: 110 · 2012: 99
FWCI
47.85
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Econometrica (publishedVersion)
  • Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (acceptedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Keywords
coordination games, convention formation, stochastic stability, repeated games, incomplete information, bounded rationality, learning, equilibrium selection, common knowledge

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.