The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
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Citations
Cites
SMITH, J. M., & PRICE, G. R. (1973) · Nature · doi:10.1038/246015a0 · Cited by 5,089
Evolutionary Games in Economics
Friedman, D. (1991) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938222 · Cited by 1,939
Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1990) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2938316 · Cited by 1,804
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
Pearce, D. G. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911197 · Cited by 1,407
Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics∗
Foster, D., & Young, P. (1990) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1016/0040-5809(90)90011-j · Cited by 948
An Iterative Method of Solving a Game
Robinson, J. (1951) · The Annals of Mathematics · doi:10.2307/1969530 · Cited by 868
A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal conflicts
Selten, R. (1980) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/s0022-5193(80)81038-1 · Cited by 556
The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
Tan, T. C.-C., & Werlang, S. R. D. C. (1988) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(88)90276-1 · Cited by 368
“Evolutionary” selection dynamics in games: Convergence and limit properties
Nachbar, J. H. (1990) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01753708 · Cited by 272
Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
Selten, R. (1983) · Mathematical Social Sciences · doi:10.1016/0165-4896(83)90012-4 · Cited by 228
Cited by
(2011) · SpringerReference · doi:10.1007/springerreference_60360 · Cited by 2,855
Young, H. P. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951778 · Cited by 2,399
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (2003) · Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society · doi:10.1090/s0273-0979-03-00988-1 · Cited by 1,354
On economic applications of evolutionary game theory
Friedman, D. (1998) · Journal of Evolutionary Economics · doi:10.1007/s001910050054 · Cited by 879
Evolution of the Social Contract
Skyrms, B. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139924825 · Cited by 743
Metadata
- Authors
- Samuelson, L., & Zhang, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1992-08
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 363-391
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1994730202
- Cited by
- 327
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 14.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Samuelson, L., & Zhang, J. (1992). Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games. Journal of Economic Theory. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90041-f
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.