The Evolution of Conventions
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The author shows how a group of individuals can learn to play a coordination game without any common knowledge and with only a small amount of rationality. The game is repeated many times by different players. Each player chooses an optimal reply based on incomplete information about what other players have done in the past. Occasionally they make mistakes. When the likelihood of mistakes is very small, typically one coordination equilibrium will be played almost all of the time over the long run. This stochastically stable equilibrium can be computed analytically using a general theorem the author proves on perturbed Markov processes. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
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“Theoretical extensions of this approach have argued that purely local interactions taking place on social networks can lead to population-wide, or “global,” coordinated behavior (1, 2, 6, 45).”
From Emergent social conventions and collective bias in LLM populations (2025) · cites this paper as [1]
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“The best-response decision-rule for non-committed agents is identical to that studied by Young (9) .”
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“These types of institutions have received the most attention in the economic study of endogenous institutional change (Alston et al., 1996; Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod, 1986; Young, 1993).”
BackgroundCongestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions
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“(This definition is slightly more general than the definition given in Young (1993), where the equilibrium reached is also required to be strict.”
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“There are various techniques for computing the stochastically stable states (Young, 1993a; Kandori et al. 1993; Blume 1995; Ellison 2000).”
Self-citationThe Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence
Dal Bó, P., & Fréchette, G. R. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.1.411 · Cited by 495
“unique stochastically stable strategy (Kandori et al., 1993, and Young, 1993 ) in games”
BackgroundPeer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Roommates
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Uninformed individuals promote democratic consensus in animal groups
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“Then by Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) and Young (1993), there exists a unique steady-state distribution associated with this process.”
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Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations
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“However, evolution in finite groups of players has received less attention, and most of the analytic results are for variants of the best-reply dynamics [e.g., Kandori et al. (1993), Young (1993) ].”
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“See, for example, Young (1993), Binmore and Samuelson (1997), Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002), and Anderson et al. (2004).”
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“…the questions that, in our opinion, should be the topics of future research (some efforts along these lines include Axelrod, 1986; Ellickson, 1989; Young, 1993; Skyrms, 2004; Greif, 2006; Kimbrough, Smith, and Wilson, 2008; Acemoglu and Jackson, 2012; Gächter, Nosenzo, and Sefton, 2013; Krupka…”
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“For instance, the MBRA (myopic best response adjustment) is such one [53], which has been used for formulating NEGs [23].”
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“1) in Young (1998). Young’s result states that for any fixed network structure the unique stochastically stable state in a symmetric coordination game is for all players to coordinate on the risk dominant strategy.”
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“5 This is an implication of Theorem 4 of Young [27], but it can be shown directly with a much shorter argument.”
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“Another learning algorithm convergent in weakly acyclic games is adaptive play [21], [11] where players have finite recall.”
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“This work includes Blume (1993), Canning (1992), Ellison (1993), Kandori et al. (1993), and Young (1993), among others.”
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“In this case, the unperturbed Markov chain corresponds to simple experimentation dynamics with � =0 , and so the recurrence classes are all states in E ∪ D. Nonetheless, we will construct resistance trees with the vertices being all possible states, i.e., E ∪ D ∪ X. The resulting conclusions remain the same (see Lemma…”
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“one to the optimal joint traffic offloading strategy as long as for each x ∈ X̃ , a ≤ F/(ΓGx + 2), where ΓGx is the length of shortest path in the best response graph of team stage game Gx [61].”
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“Kandori, Mailath, and Rob [1993] (henceforth KMR) and Young [1993](2) reanalyzed such processes, showing that the addition of small probabilities of mutations change the picture significantly.”
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Dekel, E., Ely, J. C., & Yilankaya, O. (2007) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/74.3.685 · Cited by 207
“…extensively in evolutionary models.19 The risk-dominant equilibrium is selected in the models of Ellison (1993), Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), and Young (1993); the payo¤-dominant equilibrium is favored in Ely (2002) and Robson and Vega Redondo (1996); in Binmore and Samuelson (1997) either…”
BackgroundBounded Rationality in Industrial Organization
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p-Dominance and Belief Potential
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Evolution of cooperation under -person snowdrift games
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“The evolutionary dynamics in large, finite populations, has been pioneered in economics by Young (1993) and by Kandori et al. (1993), in the limit where mutations are rare.”
BackgroundLearning to Be Thoughtless: Social Norms and Individual Computation
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“First, they are self-enforcing behavioral regularities (Lewis, 1969; Axelrod, 1986; Young, 1993a, 1995 ).”
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Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: Experimental evidence
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“Keywords: Coordination, Cooperation, Experiment, Graph Theory, Network, Local, Random, Small-World JEL ClassiÞcation: C69, C72, C91, C92 2”
BackgroundMuddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection
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Evolutionary game theory and typology: A case study
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“It has been spelled out in a different framework in Zeevat and Jäger (2002). William Rose picked up this idea as well and also formalized it using Evolutionary Game Theory.”
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Learning for Computation Offloading in Mobile Edge Computing
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“In fact, for any fixed t = , ∀t, the transition matrix of the perturbed Markov process P has following characteristics [33]: (a) P is aperiodic and irreducible, (b) lim →0 P S,S′ = P 0 S,S′ , and (c) P S,S′ > 0 for some .”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSamuelson, L. (2002) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330027256 · Cited by 213
Metadata
- Authors
- Young, H. P.
- Corresponding author
- Young, H. Peyton
- ORCID
- Young, H. Peyton
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1993-01
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 57
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2118994458
- Cited by
- 2,399
- References
- 20
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 57 · 2024: 75 · 2023: 86 · 2022: 65 · 2021: 78 · 2020: 57 · 2019: 63 · 2018: 83 · 2017: 82 · 2016: 83 · 2015: 83 · 2014: 114 · 2013: 110 · 2012: 99
- FWCI
- 47.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Econometrica (publishedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (acceptedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- coordination games, convention formation, stochastic stability, repeated games, incomplete information, bounded rationality, learning, equilibrium selection, common knowledge
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.