The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market
Abstract
This paper shows that in a frictional labour market part of the productivity gains from general training will be captured by future employers. As a result, investments in general skills will be suboptimally low, and contrary to the standard theory, part of the costs may be borne by the employers. The paper also demonstrates that the interaction between innovation and training leads to an amplification of this inefficiency and to a multiplicity of equilibria. Workers are more willing to invest in their skills by accepting lower wages today if they expect more firms to innovate and pay them higher wages in the future. Similarly, firms are more willing to innovate when they expect the quality of the future workforce to be higher, thus when workers invest more in their skills.
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Citations
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Cited by
Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. (2004) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w10481 · Cited by 3,101
Self-citationChapter 6 Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth
(2005) · Handbook of Economic Growth · doi:10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01006-3 · Cited by 2,472
The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training
Acemoglu, D., & Pischke, J. (1999) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250071 · Cited by 1,046
Self-citationWhy Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence
Acemoglu, D., & Pischke, J.-S. (1998) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355398555531 · Cited by 992
Self-citationNetworks, Firm Size and Innovation
Rogers, M. (2004) · Small Business Economics · doi:10.1023/b:sbej.0000014451.99047.69 · Cited by 691
Metadata
- Authors
- Acemoglu, D.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1997-07
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 445
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2073545542
- Cited by
- 626
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 27.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.