The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests
Abstract
The neoclassical theory of demand applies to individuals, yet in empirical work it is usually taken as valid for households with many members. This paper explores what the theory of individuals implies for households that have more than one member. We make minimal assumptions about how the individual members of the household resolve conflicts. All we assume is that however decisions are made, outcomes are efficient. We refer to this as the collective setting. We show that in the collective setting household demands must satisfy a symmetry and rank condition on the Slutsky matrix. We also present some further results on the effects on demands of variables that do not modify preferences but that do affect how decisions are made. We apply our theory to a series of surveys of household expenditures from Canada. The tests of the usual symmetry conditions are rejected for two-person households but not for one-person households. We also show that income pooling is rejected for two-person households. We then test for our collective setting conditions on the couples data. None of the collective setting restrictions are rejected. We conclude that the collective setting is a plausible and tractable next step to take in the analysis of household behavior.
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Cites
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Self-citationIncome and Outcomes: A Structural Model of Intrahousehold Allocation
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“In a collective decision making model, Browning and Chiappori (1998) show that if behaviour in the household is Pareto efficient, the household’s objective function takes the form of a weighted sum of individual utilities.”
BackgroundEstimating Consumption Economies of Scale, Adult Equivalence Scales, and Household Bargaining Power
Browning, M., Chiappori, P.-A., & Lewbel, A. (2013) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdt019 · Cited by 429
Self-citationBargaining Power Within Couples and Use of Prenatal and Delivery Care in Indonesia
Beegle, K., Frankenberg, E., & Thomas, D. (2001) · Studies in Family Planning · doi:10.1111/j.1728-4465.2001.00130.x · Cited by 400
Collective Labor Supply with Children
Blundell, R., Chiappori, P., & Meghir, C. (2005) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/491589 · Cited by 397
Self-citationHousehold Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia
Ashraf, N., Field, E., & Lee, J. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.7.2210 · Cited by 371
Quisumbing, A. R., Maluccio, J. A., Quisumbing, A. R., & Maluccio, J. A. (2000) · Unknown · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.16460 · Cited by 350
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Gabaix, X. (2019) · Handbook of Behavioral Economics: Applications and Foundations 1 · doi:10.1016/bs.hesbe.2018.11.001 · Cited by 329
Bobonis, G. J. (2009) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/600076 · Cited by 321
Public Transfers and Domestic Violence: The Roles of Private Information and Spousal Control
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Consumption Inequality and Intra-household Allocations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Browning, M., & Chiappori, P. A.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1998-11
- Volume
- 66
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1241
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2148796647
- Cited by
- 1,191
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 33.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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