The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard
Abstract
This article extends the economic theory of agency to a simple class of multiperiod situations. In this context we study the role of long-term contracts in controlling moral hazard problems. We characterize the optimal long-term contract, and show that even when the "environment" is separable over time, the agent's compensation in one period will depend on his performance in that period and his performance in the prior periods.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
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On the Frequency, Quality, and Informationl Role of Mandatory Financial Reports
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lambert, R. A.
- Venue
- The Bell Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1983
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 441
- ISSN
- 0361-915X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1491272445
- Cited by
- 321
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 8.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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