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Cited by 272

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement

Scholz, John T.·1984·Law & Society Review
DOI 10.2307/3053402
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Abstract

An ecological model based on evolutionary game theory is developed to analyze the role of egoistic cooperation in regulatory enforcement. The model demonstrates that socially beneficial cooperation depends on 1) a combination of cooperative and deterrence routines in an enforcement strategy that is at once vengeful and forgiving, 2) firms concerned enough about future enforcement encounters to forgo short-term gains from evasion, and 3) institutional arrangements that provide suitable sanctions and cost tradeoffs for existing enforcement and evasion technologies in the particular enforcement arena. Factors limiting the advantage of cooperation are also reviewed, and other applications of the model are suggested.

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Crossref · 10.2307/3053402

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Metadata

Authors
Scholz, J. T.
Venue
Law & Society Review
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
1984
Volume
18
Issue
2
Pages
179-224
ISSN
  • 0023-9216 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-5893
DOI
10.2307/3053402
OpenAlex
W2088128647
Cited by
272
References
31
FWCI
17.31
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/3053402
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Scholz, J. T. (1984). Cooperation, Deterrence, and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement. Law & Society Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/3053402

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.