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Empathy, Mind, and Morals
Abstract
Early Greek philosophers doubled as natural scientists; that is a commonplace. It is equally true, though less often remarked, that numerous historical philosophers doubled as cognitive scientists. They constructed models of mental faculties in much the spirit of modern cognitive science, for which they are widely cited as precursors in the cognitive science literature. Today, of course, there is more emphasis on experiment, and greater division of labor. Philosophers focus on theory, foundations, and methodology, while cognitive scientists are absorbed by experimental techniques and findings. Nonetheless, there are sound reasons for massive communication between philosophy and cognitive science, which happily proceeds apace. On this occasion I shall not try to enumerate or delineate these lines of communication in any comprehensive fashion. I just wish to illustrate the benefits to philosophy in two domains: the theory of mind and moral theory. Though this may sound like an ambitious agenda, I shall in fact examine just a single phenomenon: empathy. Using that term first broadly and later narrowly, I shall argue that empathy may be the key to one sector of the philosophy of mind and to several sectors of moral theory. But whether empathy can in fact unlock any doors depends heavily on the outcome of empirical research in cognitive science.
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Citations
Cited by
Understanding the intentions of others: Re-enactment of intended acts by 18-month-old children.
Meltzoff, A. N. (1995) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037//0012-1649.31.5.838 · Cited by 2,110
Tomasello, M., Kruger, A. C., & Ratner, H. H. (1993) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x0003123x · Cited by 1,891
Völlm, B. A., Taylor, A. N. W., Richardson, P., Corcoran, R., Stirling, J., McKie, S., Deakin, J. F. W., & Elliott, R. (2006) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.07.022 · Cited by 1,011
How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality
Gopnik, A. (1993) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00028636 · Cited by 967
Embodied simulation: from neurons to phenomenal experience
Gallese, V. (2005) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-005-4737-z · Cited by 947
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Goldman, A. I., & Sripada, C. S. (2005) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2004.01.005 · Cited by 647
Self-citationImitation, memory, and the representation of persons
Meltzoff, A. N., & Keith Moore, M. (1994) · Infant Behavior and Development · doi:10.1016/0163-6383(94)90024-8 · Cited by 561
Intentional relations and social understanding
Barresi, J., & Moore, C. (1996) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00041790 · Cited by 523
Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgement
Nichols, S. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0195169344.001.0001 · Cited by 515
Intentional attunement: Mirror neurons and the neural underpinnings of interpersonal relations
Gallese, V., Eagle, M. N., & Migone, P. (2007) · Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association · doi:10.1177/00030651070550010601 · Cited by 496
The psychology of folk psychology
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Metadata
- Authors
- Goldman, A. I.
- Venue
- Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1992-11
- Volume
- 66
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 17
- ISSN
- 0065-972X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2797156300
- Cited by
- 254
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 56.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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