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Cited by 523Child and Animal Learning DevelopmentAction Observation and SynchronizationSocial Robot Interaction and HRI

Intentional relations and social understanding

Barresi, John, Moore, Chris·1996·Behavioral and Brain Sciences
DOI 10.1017/s0140525x00041790
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Abstract

Organisms engage in various activities that are directed at objects, whether real or imagined. Such activities may be termed “intentional relations.” We present a four-level framework of social understanding that organizes the ways in which social organisms represent the intentional relations of themselves and other agents. We presuppose that the information available to an organism about its own intentional relations (or first person information) is qualitatively different from the information available to that organism about other agents’ intentional relations (or third person information). However, through the integration of these two sources of information, it is possible to generate representations of intentional relations that are uniformly applicable to the activities of both self and other. The four levels of the framework differ in the extent to which such integration occurs and in the degree to which imagination is involved in generating these representations. Most animals exist at the lowest level, at which integration of first and third person sources of information does not occur. Of nonhuman species, only great apes exhibit social understanding at intermediate levels, at which integration of these sources of information provides uniform representations of intentional relations. Only humans attain the highest level, at which it is possible to represent intentional relations with mental objects. We propose that with the development of the imagination, children pro…

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  • Properties of conscious processing emerge progressively during fetal and postnatal life rather than all at once.

    “All of the properties of conscious processing that were detailed above do not appear all at once but emerge progressively during fetal and postnatal life, which is why it appears useful to distinguish a few nested levels with the development of the human brain, behavior, and consciousness (Barresi and Moore, 1996; Casey et al., 2005; Changeux, 2006; Dehaene-Lambertz and Spelke, 2015; Dehaene and C”

    From Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis (2020) · cites this paper as Barresi and Moore, 1996

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Authors
Barresi, J., & Moore, C.
Affiliations
Dalhousie University (CA)
ORCID
Venue
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
1996-03
Volume
19
Issue
1
Pages
107-122
ISSN
  • 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
  • 1469-1825
DOI
10.1017/s0140525x00041790
OpenAlex
W2129131670
Cited by
523
References
9
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 26 · 2015: 18 · 2014: 24 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 27
FWCI
26.92
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 5088 d)
Locations
Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Robot Interaction and HRI
Keywords
intentional relations, social understanding, theory of mind, mental representation, imagination, great apes, cognitive development, autism spectrum disorder, social cognition, animal cognition

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