Do IRS Audits Deter Corporate Tax Avoidance?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 87 of the 87 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We extend research on the determinants of corporate tax avoidance to include the role of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) monitoring. Our evidence from large samples implies that U.S. public firms undertake less aggressive tax positions when tax enforcement is stricter. Reflecting its first-order economic impact on firms, our coefficient estimates imply that raising the probability of an IRS audit from 19 percent (the 25th percentile in our data) to 37 percent (the 75th percentile) increases their cash effective tax rates, on average, by nearly two percentage points, which amounts to a 7 percent increase in cash effective tax rates. These results are robust to controlling for firm size and time, which determine our primary proxy for IRS enforcement, in different ways; specifying several alternative dependent and test variables; and confronting potential endogeneity with instrumental variables and panel data estimations, among other techniques. JEL Classifications: M40; G34; G32; H25.
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Citations
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“Other research suggests that unlike other expenses, taxes are monitored by third parties (Hoopes et al., 2012), and tax avoidance can be a potential ‘‘hot button’’ issue if investors perceive firms as failing to pay their ‘‘fair share’’ (Dyreng et al.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Hoopes, J. L., Mescall, D., & Pittman, J. A.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2012-04-01
- Volume
- 87
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1603-1639
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W3123872135
- Cited by
- 575
- References
- 87
- FWCI
- 73.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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