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Honesty in Managerial Reporting
Open accessAbstract
This study reports the results of three experiments that examine how preferences for wealth and honesty affect managerial reporting. We find that subjects often sacrifice wealth to make honest or partially honest reports, and they generally do not lie more as the payoff to lying increases. We also find less honesty under a contract that provides a smaller share of the total surplus to the manager than under one that provides a larger share, suggesting that the extent of honesty may depend on how the surplus is divided between the manager and the firm. The optimal agency contract yields more firm profit than a contract that relies exclusively on honest reporting. However, a modified version of the optimal agency contract, which makes use of subjects' preferences for honest reporting, yields the highest firm profit. These results suggest that firms may be able to design more profitable employment contracts than those identified by conventional economic analysis.
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Cites
Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., & Smith, V. (1994) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1994.1056 · Cited by 1,674
Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games.
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (1996) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1996.0081 · Cited by 1,126
Cited by
Psychological foundations of incentives
Fehr, E., & Falk, A. (2002) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00208-2 · Cited by 1,240
LIES IN DISGUISE-AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON CHEATING
Fischbacher, U., & Föllmi-Heusi, F. (2013) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12014 · Cited by 1,243
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2002) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/1468-0297.00027 · Cited by 1,061
Schnackenberg, A. K., & Tomlinson, E. C. (2016) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206314525202 · Cited by 762
Emerging themes in management control: A review of recent literature
Berry, A. J., Coad, A. F., Harris, E. P., Otley, D. T., & Stringer, C. (2009) · The British Accounting Review · doi:10.1016/j.bar.2008.09.001 · Cited by 508
Metadata
- Authors
- Evans, J. H., Hannan, R. L., Krishnan, R., & Moser, D. V.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2001-10-01
- Volume
- 76
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 537-559
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-7967
- OpenAlex
- W3122727044
- Cited by
- 441
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 25.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Evans, J. H., Hannan, R. L., Krishnan, R., & Moser, D. V. (2001). Honesty in Managerial Reporting. The Accounting Review. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2001.76.4.537
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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