Cited by 2,404Digital Transformation in IndustryEngineering and Test SystemsReliability and Maintenance Optimization

The Digital Twin Paradigm for Future NASA and U.S. Air Force Vehicles

Open access
Glaessgen, Edward, Stargel, David·2012·53rd AIAA/ASME/ASCE/AHS/ASC Structures, Structural Dynamics and Materials Conference 20th AIAA/ASME/AHS Adaptive Structures Conference 14th AIAA

Abstract

Future generations of NASA and U.S. Air Force vehicles will require lighter mass while being subjected to higher loads and more extreme service conditions over longer time periods than the present generation. Current approaches for certification, fleet management and sustainment are largely based on statistical distributions of material properties, heuristic design philosophies, physical testing and assumed similitude between testing and operational conditions and will likely be unable to address these extreme requirements. To address the shortcomings of conventional approaches, a fundamental paradigm shift is needed. This paradigm shift, the Digital Twin, integrates ultra-high fidelity simulation with the vehicle s on-board integrated vehicle health management system, maintenance history and all available historical and fleet data to mirror the life of its flying twin and enable unprecedented levels of safety and reliability.

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

The paper proposes the Digital Twin paradigm—an integrated multiphysics, multiscale, probabilistic simulation of an as-built vehicle using best physical models, sensor updates, fleet history, and IVHM data—to mirror the life of its flying twin and improve certification, fleet management, and sustainment. It argues conventional factor-of-safety, similitude, and inspection approaches are inadequate for future NASA and U.S. Air Force vehicles with lighter mass, higher loads, and longer extreme service.

Key findings

  • Conventional certification and sustainment rely on factors-of-safety, similitude, worst-case scenarios, and fleet leaders; factors can be as large as 2.0 depending on material and configuration, a service life factor of 4.0 is applied to well-characterized spaceflight structures, and known flaws must show a safety factor of 1.5 against fracture.
  • The Digital Twin integrates ultra-high fidelity physical models, on-board IVHM sensor data, maintenance history, and historical/fleet data via data mining and text mining; it continuously forecasts vehicle health, remaining useful life, and probability of mission success, and can recommend mission profile changes or activate self-healing mechanisms.
  • Near-term opportunities include the AFRL Digital Twin: Spiral 1 using the F-15 as a testbed, and a NASA approach focused on a small highly critical non-redundant component such as a MEMS.
  • Expected advantages include decreased system weight by reducing reliance on statistical distributions, heuristic design philosophies, physical testing, and assumed similitude, plus increased reliability through continuous monitoring and mitigation of degradation and anomalous events.

Methods

  • Conceptual/vision paper, not an experimental study; it presents the Digital Twin paradigm and requirements, with examples drawn from NASA standards and handbooks including NASA-STD-5001A, NASA-STD-5019, and NASA-HDBK-5010.
  • No sample, dataset, or statistical analysis is reported; the paper discusses conventional approaches, Digital Twin attributes, near-term opportunities, advantages, and influence on national goals.
  • Illustrative figures and tables are used to motivate the paradigm, such as an STS payload launch/landing spectrum and upper-bound fatigue crack growth rate curves estimated as three standard deviations above mean values.

Limitations

  • The paper states the Digital Twin is an ambitious concept “unlikely to attain maturity for many decades,” so a series of intermediate steps is required.
  • The paper states future vehicles may encounter conditions that cannot be foreseen, and long-duration space missions may make conventional inspection and maintenance impossible.
  • Evident from the text: no quantitative validation, implementation results, or performance metrics for a Digital Twin are reported; the work is a concept and roadmap paper.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.2514/6.2012-1818

Cites

1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Claims the paper makes

0 of 21 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

  • Interpretationreasoning

    When similitude is violated, probabilistic methods break down as readily as those based on factors-of-safety.

    “When similitude is violated, probabilistic methods break down as readily as those based on factors-of-safety.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Premisenone given

    Current approaches for certification, fleet management and sustainment of NASA and U.S. Air Force vehicles are largely based on statistical distributions of material properties, heuristic design philosophies, physical testing and assumed similitude between testing and operational conditions.

    “Current approaches for certification, fleet management and sustainment are largely based on statistical distributions of material properties, heuristic design philosophies, physical testing and assumed similitude between testing and operational conditions and will likely be unable to address these extreme requirements.”
    • Also stated in: § Introduction · plain
      “Existing methodologies for vehicle certification, fleet management and sustainment are largely based on similitude and a heuristic understanding of the effects of operational and anomalous conditions on the structural health, safety and performance of a vehicle.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Interpretationreasoning

    Computer codes used to predict failures are of limited predictive capability because they only produce responses that have previously been observed experimentally and then programmed for future assessment.

    “Such codes are of limited”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Interpretationreasoning

    Current approaches for certification, fleet management and sustainment will likely be unable to address future extreme requirements.

    “Current approaches for certification, fleet management and sustainment are largely based on statistical distributions of material properties, heuristic design philosophies, physical testing and assumed similitude between testing and operational conditions and will likely be unable to address these extreme requirements.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Interpretationreasoning

    Current probabilistic or reliability methodologies are inadequate because they are based on assumed similitude between the circumstances in which the underlying statistics were obtained and the environment in which the vehicle operates.

    “Even current probabilistic or reliability methodologies are inadequate because they are based on assumed similitude between the circumstances in which the underlying statistics were obtained and the environment in which the vehicle operates.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • May combine two claims. 15
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 39
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Compounding of factors-of-safety is pervasive and may lead to unnecessarily heavy structures and reduced performance without necessarily improving the actual safety of the vehicle or the probability of mission success.

    “Additionally, compounding of factors-of-safety is pervasive and may lead to unnecessarily heavy structures and reduced performance without necessarily improving the actual safety of the vehicle or the probability of mission success.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    Inspection schedules for fleet management and sustainment are typically determined from experience with similar vehicles that have performed similar missions.

    “Inspection schedules are typically determined from experience with similar vehicles that have performed similar missions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    Inspection is often performed based on experience with the fleet leader, the vehicle in the fleet that experienced the most flights or the worst degradation.

    “Often, inspection is performed based on experience with the fleet leader, the vehicle in the fleet that experienced the most flights or the worst degradation.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

    Interpretationreasoning

    The ability to fully understand degradation and anomalous events and foresee previously unknown unknowns may represent the difference between mission success and mission failure.

    “Thus, the ability to fully understand degradation and anomalous events and foresee previously unknown unknowns may represent the difference between mission success and mission failure.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisereasoning

    If unacceptable degradation of a component is found during inspection of the fleet leader, it may be decided that all vehicles of that class be inspected immediately regardless of the specific history of each vehicle.

    “If, for example, unacceptable degradation of a component was found during an inspection of the fleet leader, it may be decided that all vehicles of that class be inspected immediately regardless of the specific history of each vehicle.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    NASA-HDBK-5010 discusses separate conservatisms for crack size, applied loads, material properties, and analysis for known cracks in fracture critical hardware.

    “An extreme case of codified conservatism is discussed in NASA-HDBK-5010 10 , where separate conservatisms for crack size, applied loads, material properties, and analysis are discussed for”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites NASA-HDBK-5010

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    The Digital Twin will decrease system weight by reducing reliance on statistical distributions of material properties, heuristic design philosophies, physical testing and assumed similitude between testing and operational conditions.

    “It will also decrease system weight by reducing reliance on statistical distributions of material properties, heuristic design philosophies, physical testing and assumed similitude between testing and operational conditions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    According to NASA-STD-5001A, a service life factor of 4.0 is applied to spaceflight structures made of well-characterized materials with sufficient load cycle data, while structures made of not well-characterized materials or complex failure modes may require an additional factor and testing.

    “According to NASA-STD-5001A 1 , a service life factor of 4.0 is applied to”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites NASA-STD-5001A

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Known cracks in fracture critical hardware require special treatment wherein upper bounds for crack size estimate accounting for any possible nondetected adjacent cracks and/or crack tip extensions are required.

    “Known cracks in fracture critical hardware require special treatment wherein upper bounds for crack size estimate accounting for”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites NASA-HDBK-5010

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Analyses of known flaws must show that the component has a service life factor of four and a safety factor of 1.5 against fracture.

    “Finally, analyses of known flaws must show that the component has a service life factor of four and a safety factor of 1.5 against fracture.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites NASA-HDBK-5010

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    AFRL Digital Twin: Spiral 1 is a plan to integrate existing state-of-the-art technologies, benchmark current capabilities and identify gaps using components from an existing U.S. Air Force vehicle, specifically the F-15, as a testbed.

    “Among these steps is the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Digital Twin: Spiral 1 17 , a plan to integrate existing state-of-the-art technologies, benchmark current capabilities and identify gaps using components from an existing U.S. Air Force vehicle, specifically, the F-15, as a testbed.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [17]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Complex missions, particularly those where external support is difficult or impossible, will necessitate complete real-time management of complex materials, structures and systems that will ultimately lead to self-aware vehicles.

    “Complex missions, particularly those where external support is difficult or impossible, will necessitate complete real-time management of complex materials, structures and systems that will ultimately lead to”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The consequences of failure during a long-duration space mission, where the vehicle is far from home, will almost certainly be catastrophic.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The Digital Twin continuously forecasts the health of the vehicle or system, the remaining useful life and the probability of mission success.

    “By combining all of this information, the Digital Twin continuously forecasts the health of the vehicle or system, the remaining useful life and the probability of mission success.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationnone given

    The vision for the Digital Twin integrates the broad range of technologies with a singular focus.

    “Unlike those individual visions, the vision for the Digital Twin integrates the broad range of technologies with a singular focus.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Verification depends on the ability to perform laboratory tests on a dedicated test structure identical to the flight structure, and loading, boundary conditions, and environment must be representative of flight conditions.

    “In all of these cases,”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites NASA-STD-5001A

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    If various best-physics models can be integrated with one another and with on-board sensor suites, they will form a basis for certification of vehicles by simulation and for real-time, continuous, health management of those vehicles during their missions.

    “If various best-physics (i.e., the most accurate, physically realistic and robust) models can be integrated with one another and with on-board sensor suites, they will form a basis for certification of vehicles by simulation and for real-time, continuous, health management of those vehicles during their missions.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    As a result of future vehicle requirements, demands on structural materials will be greatly increased and structural margins will necessarily be decreased.

    “As a result, demands on structural materials will be greatly increased and structural margins will necessarily be decreased.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Future generations of NASA and U.S. Air Force vehicles will require lighter mass while being subjected to higher loads and more extreme service conditions over longer time periods than the present generation.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    As a virtual instantiation of a flying vehicle, the Digital Twin is expected to be able to experience every event that its flying twin experiences.

    “As a virtual instantiation of a flying vehicle, the Digital Twin is expected to be able to experience every event that its flying twin experiences.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    Because the vehicles needed for future extreme missions are unlikely to be developed using existing material forms, the design and development of new enabling materials is required and is well aligned with the NRC's ICME roadmap.

    “Because the vehicles needed for future extreme missions are unlikely to be developed using existing material forms, the design and development of new enabling (e.g., multifunctional, nanostructured, ultra-durable) materials is required and is well aligned with the NRC's ICME roadmap.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [20]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Application of continuum fracture mechanics analyses, including NASGRO fatigue crack growth analysis, is the foundation of much of the codified fracture control methodology.

    “The application of continuum fracture mechanics analyses, including NASGRO fatigue crack growth analysis (see JSC 22267B 6 ), is the foundation of much of the codified fracture control methodology.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites JSC 22267B

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationcitation

    The ability to assess the evolution of defects is a critical element within the Digital Twin's on-board IVHM system and is well aligned with the NRC's advocacy for developments in Materials State Awareness.

    “The ability to assess the evolution of defects is a critical element within the Digital Twin's on-board IVHM system and is well aligned with the NRC's advocacy for developments in Materials State Awareness.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites [21]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    The protoflight approach requires a factor-of-safety for yield that is higher than the factor-of-safety used for prototype testing.

    “The latter approach requires a factor-of-safety for yield that is higher than the factor-of-safety used for prototype testing.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites NASA-STD-5001A

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    The Digital Twin can predict system response to safety critical events and uncover previously unknown issues before they become critical by comparing predicted and actual responses.

    “The Digital Twin can also predict system response to safety critical events and uncover previously unknown issues before they become critical by comparing predicted and actual responses.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    Because of its ability to mirror the life of a specific vehicle in an as-built state, the Digital Twin will necessarily revolutionize certification, fleet management and sustainment.

    “Because of its ability to mirror the life of a specific vehicle in an as-built state, the Digital Twin will necessarily revolutionize certification, fleet management and sustainment.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Fracture critical hardware requires the additional imposition of damage tolerance requirements.

    “Fracture critical hardware requires the additional imposition of damage tolerance requirements (see, for example, NASA-STD-5019 2 ).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites NASA-STD-5019

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    The Digital Twin concept is unlikely to attain maturity for many decades, so a series of intermediate steps is required.

    “However, such an ambitious concept is unlikely to attain maturity for many decades, so a series of intermediate steps is required.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: The Digital Twin concept is unlikely to attain maturity for many decades.
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationreasoning

    The extensive legacy of historical flight information incorporated in standards and handbooks will likely be insufficient to either certify future extreme vehicles or to guarantee mission success.

    “Thus, the extensive legacy of historical flight information incorporated in the various standards and handbooks that were based on decades of aircraft and spacecraft design experience, will likely be insufficient to either certify future extreme vehicles or to guarantee mission success.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
    • Rests on an assumption: Future generations of vehicles will rely on increasingly complex, heterogeneous and multifunctional material forms with increasingly complex failure modes.
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

    Premisecitation

    Minimum design and test factors-of-safety for metallic and composite structures in NASA-STD-5001A vary widely depending on circumstance and can be as large as 2.0 depending on material and local structural configuration.

    “These factors vary widely depending on circumstance and can be as large as 2.0 depending on the material and local structural configuration.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites NASA-STD-5001A

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Worst-case limit loads for the mission must be used to compute the far field stress state at the location of the detected crack.

    “Additionally, worst-case limit loads for the mission must be used to compute the far field stress state at the location of the detected crack.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites NASA-HDBK-5010

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    An understanding of the exact state of the structure of the vehicle or its systems, including existence of defects at the microstructural and possibly atomistic scale, is required as a baseline for ultra-high fidelity simulations.

    “Additionally, an understanding of the exact state of the structure of the vehicle or its systems, including the existence of defects at the microstructural and, possibly, the atomistic scale, is required as a baseline for ultra-high fidelity simulations.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    The Digital Twin will enable mission managers to make knowledgeable decisions regarding the consequences of possible in-flight changes to a vehicle's mission.

    “Additionally, it will enable mission managers to make knowledgeable decisions regarding the consequences of possible in-flight changes to a vehicle's mission.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationreasoning

    Once the vehicle is launched, the Digital Twin will increase the reliability of the flying vehicle because of its ability to continuously monitor and mitigate degradation and anomalous events.

    “Once the vehicle is launched, the Digital Twin will increase the reliability of the flying vehicle because of its ability to continuously monitor and mitigate degradation and anomalous events.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Because of apparent scatter in material response under cyclic and creep loading, corresponding factors-of-safety are even larger.

    “Because of the apparent scatter in material response under cyclic and creep loading, the corresponding factors are even larger.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites NASA-STD-5001A

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Premisenone given

    Many of the technologies critical for the Digital Twin are currently being developed under related visions for multi-scale and multi-physics modeling, structural health management, high-performance computing and others.

    “Many of the technologies critical for the Digital Twin are currently being developed under related visions for multi-scale and multi-physics modeling, structural health management, highperformance computing and others.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    The systems on board the Digital Twin are capable of mitigating damage or degradation by activating self-healing mechanisms or by recommending changes in mission profile to decrease loadings, thereby increasing both the life span and the probability of mission success.

    “Finally, the systems on board the Digital Twin are capable of mitigating damage or degradation by activating self-healing mechanisms or by recommending changes in mission profile to decrease loadings thereby increasing both the life span and the probability of mission success.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • May combine two claims.

    Interpretationnone given

    Codified practices tend to be reactive rather than proactive and are often based on heuristic experience, worst-case scenarios and fleet leaders rather than on the specific material, structural configuration and usage of an individual vehicle.

    “However, they tend to be reactive rather than proactive and are often based on heuristic experience, worst-case scenarios and fleet leaders rather than on the specific material, structural configuration and usage of an individual vehicle.”
    Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    The handbook requires analysts to use material properties corresponding to the lower bound of fracture toughness and the upper bound of fatigue crack growth rate.

    “The handbook requires analysts to use material properties corresponding to the lower bound of fracture toughness and the upper bound of fatigue crack growth rate (da/dN vs. ΔK) as shown in Figure 2.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites NASA-HDBK-5010

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    Upper bounds of fatigue crack growth rate curves are either visually estimated or statistically estimated as being three standard deviations above the mean values.

    “Upper bounds of fatigue crack growth rate curves are either visually estimated or statistically estimated as being three standard deviations above the mean values.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites NASA-HDBK-5010

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    By replacing conventional engineering practices with an understanding of the degradation of an individual vehicle or vehicle system, the paradigm of the Digital Twin will impact the way that physical items ranging from micro-devices to civil infrastructure are developed, certified and maintained.

    “By replacing conventional engineering practices with an understanding of the degradation of an individual vehicle or vehicle system, the paradigm of the Digital Twin will impact the way that physical items ranging from micro-devices to civil infrastructure are developed, certified and maintained.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Interpretationcitation

    The Digital Twin paradigm can provide focus to the recent advocacy of the National Science Foundation and the National Research Council in the areas of Simulation Based Engineering Science, Integrated Computational Materials Engineering and Materials State Awareness.

    “In addition to its prominence in the recently-published roadmaps of NASA's Office of Chief Technologist (OCT) [15][16] and plans of the Air Force Research Laboratory [17][18] , the Digital Twin paradigm can provide focus to the recent advocacy of the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the National Research Council (NRC) in the areas of Simulation Based Engineering Science (SBES) 19 , Integrated”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked
    • cites [19]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [20]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

    • cites [21]

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    By exercising ultra-high fidelity approaches on flight hardware, the shortcomings of the existing state-of-the-art in multiscale modeling, in-situ experimentation and material state awareness will be highlighted.

    “By exercising such ultra-high fidelity approaches on flight hardware, the shortcomings of the existing state-of-the-art in multiscale modeling, in-situ experimentation and material state awareness will be highlighted.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

    Premisecitation

    The crack size assumed for analysis is a combination of NDE-detected crack dimensions and an adjustment based on NDE detection capability.

    “Here, the crack size assumed for analysis (2c A ) is a combination of the NDE-detected crack dimensions (2c D ) and an adjustment based on the NDE detection capability (2c N ).”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked
    • cites NASA-HDBK-5010

      Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  • Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

    Interpretationnone given

    Potential spin-offs from the development of the Digital Twin span the breadth of the Nation's industrial and manufacturing sectors, infrastructure and development of nanotechnology.

    “Potential spin-offs from the development of the Digital Twin span the breadth of the Nation's industrial and manufacturing sectors, infrastructure and development of nanotechnology.”
    Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
43 of 43
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Future generations of NASA and U.S. Air Force vehicles will require lighter mass while being subjected to higher loads and more extreme service conditions over longer time periods than the present generation.

    “Future generations of NASA and U.S. Air Force vehicles will require lighter mass while being subjected to higher loads and more extreme service conditions over longer time periods than the present generation.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Future vehicles will have little direct precedent to follow, and in some cases (e.g., long duration space missions) the vehicle may be impossible to inspect and maintain in the conventional sense.

    “Unlike the methods used to insure safety and reliability of existing vehicles that have a clear and wellunderstood legacy, many future vehicles will have little direct precedent to follow, and in some cases (e.g., long duration space missions) the vehicle may be impossible to inspect and maintain in the conventional sense.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Future generations of vehicles will rely on increasingly complex, heterogeneous and multifunctional material forms with increasingly complex failure modes.

    “Future generations of vehicles will rely on increasingly complex, heterogeneous and multifunctional material forms with increasingly complex failure modes.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The extensive physical testing that provided the confidence needed to assure the success of previous missions has become increasingly expensive to perform.

    “Additionally, the extensive physical testing that provided the confidence needed to assure the success of previous missions has become increasingly expensive to perform.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The consequences of failure during a long-duration space mission, where the vehicle is far from home, will almost certainly be catastrophic.

    “Moreover, the consequences of failure during a long-duration space mission, where the vehicle is far from home, will almost certainly be catastrophic.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The Digital Twin concept is unlikely to attain maturity for many decades.

    “However, such an ambitious concept is unlikely to attain maturity for many decades, so a series of intermediate steps is required.”
6 of 6

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • DT consists of three parts: the physical product, the virtual product, and the communication platform between them.

    “Consequently, DT consists of three parts, which include the physical product, virtual product, and the communication platform between them (Glaessgen & Stargel 2012).”

    From A review of digital twin applications in construction (2022) · cites this paper as Glaessgen & Stargel 2012

    The Concept section describes a digital simulation that mirrors an as-built vehicle and incorporates sensor data from it, supporting the physical–virtual relationship. It does not describe the Digital Twin as three parts or identify a communication platform as a distinct part (page not available in our copy). (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Conventional maintenance methods are more reactive than proactive.

    “This makes these methods more reactive than proactive [31].”

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

  • Handbook 5010 is identified as both HDBK and STD

    Minor

    The text cites document 5010 as NASA-HDBK-5010, but reference 10 identifies it as NASA-STD-5010.

1 of 1

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 9

  1. Anon, 2008, NASA-STD-5019
  2. Anon, 2008, NASA-STD-6016
  3. Anon, 2001, Version 3, 0, 22267B
  4. Anon, Fracture Control Implementation Handbook for Payloads, Experiments, and Similar Hardware,"NASA-STD-5010,May2005
  5. Anon, 2004, Rules for Construction of Pressure Vessels
  6. Kobryn P.A., 2011, USAF Air Force Research Laboratory, 88ABW-, 01428
  7. Anon, 2006, Simulation-Based Engineering Science: Revolutionizing Engineering Science through Simulation
  8. Anon, 2008, National Research Council, ISBN, 0, 12000
  9. Anon, 2008, National Research Council,ISBN, 0, 12166

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Glaessgen, E., & Stargel, D.
Affiliations
  • Langley Research Center (US)
  • United States Air Force Office of Scientific Research (US)
Venue
53rd AIAA/ASME/ASCE/AHS/ASC Structures, Structural Dynamics and Materials Conference 20th AIAA/ASME/AHS Adaptive Structures Conference 14th AIAA
Published
2012-04-23
OpenAlex
W2046074714
Cited by
2,404
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 214 · 2025: 332 · 2024: 451 · 2023: 381 · 2022: 342 · 2021: 278 · 2020: 211 · 2019: 108 · 2018: 48 · 2017: 13 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 4
FWCI
11.20
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
NASA STI Repository (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering › Digital Transformation in Industry
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Engineering and Test Systems
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality › Reliability and Maintenance Optimization
Keywords
digital twin, integrated vehicle health management, aircraft certification, fleet management, program sustainability, material property variation, maintenance history, safety and reliability

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-11.

Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-11.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

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