Moral agency without responsibility? Analysis of three ethical models of human-computer interaction in times of artificial intelligence (AI)
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Philosophical and sociological approaches in technology have increasingly shifted toward describing AI (artificial intelligence) systems as ‘(moral) agents,’ while also attributing ‘agency’ to them. It is only in this way – so their principal argument goes – that the effects of technological components in a complex human-computer interaction can be understood sufficiently in phenomenological-descriptive and ethical-normative respects. By contrast, this article aims to demonstrate that an explanatory model only achieves a descriptively and normatively satisfactory result if the concepts of ‘(moral) agent’ and ‘(moral) agency’ are exclusively related to human agents. Initially, the division between symbolic and sub-symbolic AI, the black box character of (deep) machine learning, and the complex relationship network in the provision and application of machine learning are outlined. Next, the ontological and action-theoretical basic assumptions of an ‘agency’ attribution regarding both the current teleology-naturalism debate and the explanatory model of actor network theory are examined. On this basis, the technical-philosophical approaches of Luciano Floridi, Deborah G. Johnson, and Peter-Paul Verbeek will all be critically discussed. Despite their different approaches, they tend to fully integrate computational behavior into their concept of ‘(moral) agency.’ By contrast, this essay recommends distinguishing conceptually between the different entities, causalities, and relationships in a human-computer interaction, arguing that this is the only way to do justice to both human responsibility and the moral significance and causality of computational behavior.
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Cites
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Cited by
Anthropomorphism in AI: hype and fallacy
Placani, A. (2024) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-024-00419-4 · Cited by 170
“For a useful criticism of this view, see Fritz, et al. [48]. who these others are (e.g., in terms of appearance, group membership) [29].”
Perspectives about artificial moral agents
Martinho, A., Poulsen, A., Kroesen, M., & Chorus, C. (2021) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-021-00055-2 · Cited by 27
“However, it is debated whether human-like prerequisites for moral agency should be imposed on machines or if a hard line should be drawn between human moral agency and that of machines [30, 33, 34, 49].”
BackgroundDesigning robots that do no harm: understanding the challenges of Ethics for Robots
Hutler, B., Rieder, T. N., Mathews, D. J. H., Handelman, D. A., & Greenberg, A. M. (2024) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-023-00283-8 · Cited by 16
“To avoid confusion, we suggest the inelegant shorthand “robot responsibility” to refer to this unique form of responsibility [25].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Fritz, A., Brandt, W., Gimpel, H., & Bayer, S.
- Venue
- De Ethica
- Published
- 2020-06-30
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3-22
- ISSN
- 2001-8819 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3035965895
- Cited by
- 37
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 5.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
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- Fritz, A., Brandt, W., Gimpel, H., & Bayer, S. (2020). Moral agency without responsibility? Analysis of three ethical models of human-computer interaction in times of artificial intelligence (AI). De Ethica. https://doi.org/10.3384/de-ethica.2001-8819.20613
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